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THE ECONOMIC  EXPERIENCE  of  the  past  decade  has  confirmed the 
limitations  of stabilization  policy for slowing inflation.  The two reces- 
sions of the decade  revealed  how costly it is to stop an entrenched  infla- 
tion by creating  economic slack. Two episodes of massive increase in 
energy  prices exposed the vulnerability  of the average price level to 
exogenous  supply  shocks. And the economy's  performance  throughout 
the decade  frustrated  attempts  to combine  price stability  with goals for 
high  employment  that are conventionally  accepted  and that are  based on 
observations  of the labor  market. 
The failure  to stop inflation  during  the past ten years  contrasts  starkly 
with the success  achieved  in reducing  unemployment  during  the 1960s. 
As a consequence,  professional  macroeconomics  has been in ferment 
throughout  the past decade. In contrast to the broad consensus that 
existed  ten years ago about stabilization,  today there is substantial  dis- 
agreement  about  how to deal  with  inflation  and  about  the costs of alterna- 
tive strategies  for slowing  it. The predominant  way of thinking  about  this 
problem  is based on an economy with quantity-adjusting  markets  and 
involuntary  cyclical  unemployment.  Within  this neo-Keynesian  model of 
the macroeconomy,  a Phillips  curve  represents  the short-run  response  of 
wage inflation  to cyclical variations  in unemployment.  Most prices are 
largely  determined  by the costs of inputs,  the most important  of which  is 
labor.  But the response  of the average  price level to cyclical  fluctuations 
is magnified  by the movement  of volatile raw materials  prices and by a 
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small cyclical response of price-wage  margins.  The model also takes 
account  of inertia  in wage inflation  and of some feedback  from prices 
back to wages.  Exogenous  shocks  to prices or wages are additive  to the 
price  or wage change  generated  by the Phillips  curve-inertia  mechanism. 
And movements  in exchange  rates affect  domestic  prices  insofar  as they 
do not simply compensate  for inflation  differentials.  I have previously 
referred  to this general  description  of the inflation  process  as a mainline 
view.' 
An alternative  view of the macroeconomy  comes from the "new 
classical"  or "pre-Keynesian  school." It is rooted in a world of price 
takers  and  only transitory  departures  from  full-employment  equilibrium. 
Although  rational  expectations  are neither necessary  nor sufficient  for 
most of its results,  this new classical  school is closely identified  with the 
macroeconomic  literature  based on rational  expectations  about prices. 
In that  literature,  the observed  Phillips  curve  reflects  quantities  fluctuat- 
ing in response  to unanticipated  disturbances  to prices. If price move- 
ments are anticipated,  output will not depart systematically  from its 
equilibrium  path,  and  unemployment  will not depart  systematically  from 
some  natural  or equilibrium  rate. In most versions  of these new classical 
models,  unanticipated  changes  in prices come from monetary  surprises. 
Expected  changes  in money are fully reflected  in corresponding  changes 
in the average  price  level and have no effects  on output  or employment. 
The gradual  buildup  of inflation  during  the 1960s was well predicted 
by the mainline  models and their cyclical  Phillips  curves.  The failure  of 
inflation  to slow in the face of recession  required  important  amendments 
to take account  of the inertia  in inflation  as well as improved  measures 
of labor market  tightness.  The new classical  models cannot readily  ex- 
plain the sustained decline in unemployment  that characterized  the 
1960s, except  by defining  it as a continual  decline in the natural  unem- 
ployment  rate;  and they require  a continual  upward  revision  of the natu- 
ral unemployment  rate to explain  the failure  of inflation  to slow in the 
early 1970s. The mainline  models correctly  anticipated  the effects  of the 
OPEC oil price increase  on inflation  and unemployment  and correctly 
predicted  the stagflation  that followed. These developments  were incor- 
rectly  predicted  by the new classical  models  that  presume  price  flexibility. 
Thus  the new classical  economics  has not been supported  by its ability  to 
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predict  or explain  the economic  developments  of the past two decades, 
nor even by any gross failures  of the mainline  models to explain those 
developments  once the great  inertia  of inflation  in the 1970s is allowed 
for. However,  the inflation  equations  of mainline  models have not been 
empirically  stable.  The movement  up to a new plateau  in wage inflation 
after the 1960s is imperfectly  understood.  And there remain  unsettled 
analytic  questions  within  the mainline  framework  concerning  the inflation 
process  and  the response  of inflation  to policy actions. 
In this paper  I present  a model of wage inflation  that stays  within  the 
general  mainline  framework;  but by explicitly  describing  the wage-setting 
process that underlies  macro inflation,  it arrives  at an empirical  char- 
acterization  of inflation  that is different  from past work. That empirical 
model  is supported  by the data on inflation,  especially  the developments 
of the past  decade.2  The wage-setting  model  is based  on the codetermina- 
tion of wages and employment  at the level of the firm.  It distinguishes 
sharply  between  two parts of the wage-setting  process: one that gives 
rise to the cyclical Phillips curve and one that gives wage inflation  its 
persistence.  The model makes  no use of the concepts  of a natural  unem- 
ployment  rate and acceleration  in explaining  wage inflation  and implies 
that the use of these concepts  in empirical  work during  the past decade 
has been inappropriate  and misleading. 
After presenting  the wage-setting  model, I review  the inflation  of the 
past  decade  and  then  provide  empirical  estimates  of wage inflation  based 
on the model and informed  by developments  of the 1970s. Monetarist 
models and, even more, new classical models, take a different  view of 
inflation  and the macroeconomy  than the one developed here. I then 
examine  some evidence  on the performance  of these models in explain- 
ing  inflation.  I conclude  by comparing  remedies  for inflation. 
Inflation with Keynesian Unemployment 
Inflation  in the model of this paper  is an extension  of the Keynesian 
analysis  of real activity.  The defining  characteristic  of Keynesian  unem- 
2. I do not consider price inflation separately, although the effect of prices on 
wages is part of the model. Apart from fuel prices, which have been dominated by 
OPEC, U.S. price regulations,  and food prices that have moved in response to crop 
conditions and the beef cycle, price inflation in the U.S. economy has been closely 
determined  by wage inflation,  See, for instance, Robert  J. Gordon, "Can  the Inflation 
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ployment  is that qualified  people who want jobs at the going wage are 
out of work  while  others  are  underemployed.  It is the inflationary  process 
in this situation  that I want  to model because  it is the situation  that usu- 
ally exists.3 
As the overall  labor  market  tightens,  unemployment  in some segments 
of the market  approaches  the frictional  or structural  limits associated 
with optimal  job search  and shifting  employment  needs among  firms.  If 
unemployment  at frictional  or structural  levels is taken  to define  a natu- 
ral unemployment  rate, then there  would be no unique  natural  rate in a 
heterogeneous  labor market  but a broad zone within which more and 
more segments  of the market  approach  their natural  rate. Time enters 
into the concept,  for as the labor  market  tightens  in some segments,  firms 
restructure  their  job requirements  or invest  in training  in order  to employ 
workers  from other  segments.  We may  have been in this zone by the end 
of the 1960s. The present  model does not reject  the concept  of a natural 
rate  understood  in this way. It does reject  the idea, common  in models  of 
the past decade, that a natural  rate can be identified  conceptually  with 
the point at which inflation  worsens  or improves,  or can be discovered 
empirically  by simple manipulations  of a Phillips curve. Inflation  is a 
by-product  of the process  by which  wages and employment,  at the level 
of the firm,  are  codetermined;  and  it can  worsen  with  widespread  Keynes- 
ian unemployment,  well short  of any  natural  rate  zone. 
I will not review the extensive  recent literature  explaining  the exis- 
tence of Keynesian  unemployment  by showing  that it is not optimal  for 
firms  to cut wages in order  to clear the labor market.4  And I will make 
use of Arthur  Okun's  characterization  of the job market  as one in which 
most  firms  maintain  fairly  long-term  career  relationships  with their  work- 
3. The modern analysis of flows through employment and unemployment blurs 
this concept but does not destroy its point for the present purpose. In an economy 
with Keynesian unemployment, many workers hold jobs that are inferior to those 
for which they are qualified; and both the number and duration of unemployment 
spells are above frictional levels. This situation  is not explainable  by a misperceptions 
model of search theory wherein unemployment exists above a frictional level only 
until workers  learn what job offers are truly available. 
4.  Baily pioneered the contract theory of sticky wages as an outgrowth of risk 
aversion.  Okun  emphasized  the long-term  ties between workers  and firms.  See Martin 
Neil Baily, "Wages  and Employment  under  Uncertain  Demand,"  Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 41  (January 1974),  pp. 37-50;  and Arthur M. Okun, "Inflation: Its 
Mechanics  and Welfare Costs,"  BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 351-90. In his paper in this issue, 
Robert E. Hall develops in depth the case for sticky wages and presents numerous 
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ers. Employment  arrangements  involve implicit  contracts  between  firms 
and their workers  that translate  most of the variation  in demand  that 
firms  experience  into variations  in employment  rather  than wages. The 
explicit  contracts  of collective  bargaining  are, for this purpose,  a special 
case of implicit  contracts,  although  at times they may be especially  im- 
portant  in the behavior  of overall  wages.  In 1970, 28 percent  of the pri- 
vate nonf  arm wage bill came from wages covered by major collective 
bargaining  agreements,  although  that percentage  has declined steadily 
since. 
A part  of the labor  market  operates  more  nearly  as an auction  market, 
with  wages  relatively  sensitive  to the firms'  employment  needs and to the 
state of the labor  market.  Wages  in this part of the market  are nonethe- 
less influenced  by wage levels in general,  either  through  competition  for 
workers  with given qualifications  or through  the minimum  wage that is 
related  to average  wages in the economy. This sector cannot clear the 
entire  market  because  it is too small  a part  of the total and  because  many 
people normally  confine their job seeking to firms and sectors having 
implicit  or explicit  contracts. 
THREE  SOURCES  OF  WAGE  CHANGE 
In this job market  there are three distinct economic processes that 
potentially  act on wages. One is the response  of average  real wages to 
Keynesian  unemployment  and changes in demand. In the usual static 
models,  the real  wage must  fall in order  to reduce  the level of Keynesian 
unemployment.  In fact, the real wage expressed  in terms  of the price of 
output  produced  by labor shows no systematic  cyclical movement.  This 
persistent  empirical  fact means that real wage variation  is unimportant 
in modeling  the economy's  cyclical  behavior.5  More fundamentally,  the 
inflation  process  takes  place in terms  of nominal  rather  than real wages. 
5. On this point, there is agreement  with Robert Lucas in his attempt  to model the 
cycle as an equilibrium  phenomenon. See Robert  E. Lucas, Jr., "Understanding  Busi- 
ness Cycles,"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer,  eds., Stabilization  of the Domes- 
tic and International Economy, Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on  Public 
Policy, vol. 5 (Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 1977), p. 17. However, models of search 
theory have sometimes  been expressed  in terms of real wages, producing  the classical 
result that unemployment  departs from a natural unemployment rate only through 
misperceptions  of prices. Within the mainline framework,  the Phillips curve is some- 
times modeled as a relation in real rather than nominal wages. This seems to imply 
that real wages are higher with lower unemployment, contrary to the Keynesian 
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Prices  may be a factor  influencing  nominal  wages. But it is the process 
by which nominal  wages are determined  that is central to explaining 
wage inflation. 
The process  of nominal  wage setting  has two distinct  parts.  The first 
is the response  of nominal  wages to unemployment  and demand.  This 
is the cyclical  part of the model and is based on relative  wage changes 
that accompany  changes  in employment  at the level of the firm. It is 
central  to how labor resources  are allocated and generates  the part of 
the inflation  story associated  with the short-run  Phillips  curve.  The sec- 
ond is the response  of nominal  wages  in individual  firms  to a wage norm 
for the economy.  By definition,  the norm is unrelated  to current  unem- 
ployment  or demand.  A firm's  relative wages do not change when it 
increases  them at the norm rate, so keeping up with the norm leaves 
employment  in the typical  firm  unchanged.  This part of the process  has 
no consequences  for allocation,  but it is an important  part  of the chronic 
inflation  story. 
CYCLICAL  WAGE  CHANGES 
To analyze  the cyclical part of the model, I first abstract  from the 
effects of the norm by assuming  it is zero and that average  wages are 
initially  stable.  The cyclical part of the model explains  the existence  of 
wage inflation  at a fixed unemployment  rate and the relation  between 
wage inflation  and varying  unemployment  rates. It is based on the re- 
sponse of individual  firms  to changes  in the demand  for their product. 
In this response,  firms  adjust  relative  wage levels to achieve  employment 
targets, and in this sense wages and employment  are codetermined.6 
Expectations  of demand  by firms may play some part in determining 
their desired employment  levels. But any distinctive  effect from such 
expectations  is short-lived  if they are not confirmed  by actual  orders  or 
sales, so I focus on the response  of firms  to actual  changes  in demand. 
Consider  the case in which total employment  changes.  Starting  from 
a position of Keynesian  unemployment,  an expansion  of total real de- 
6.  James Tobin modeled the cyclical behavior  of wages that leads to the observed 
Phillips curve as a response in rates of change to excess demands  and supplies  in indi- 
vidual sectors; the model has somewhat different  properties  than the one developed 
here. See his "Inflation  and Unemployment,"  American Economic Review, vol. 62 
(March 1972), pp. 1-18. George  L. Perry  213 
mand will lead to higher aggregate  employment  and lower unemploy- 
ment.  At the level of the firm,  this expansion  will, in general,  lead to a 
rise in wages offered  by some firms  that need to attract  workers.  If the 
demand  increase  is concentrated  among high-wage  firms that workers 
are eager to join, there may be no wage increase  there; but increases 
may then be needed among low-wage firms, some of whose original 
workers  switch  to better  jobs.7  Following these initial increases  among 
firms  that  must  raise  wages  to attract  employees,  there  may  be subsequent 
increases  in wages at other  firms  designed  to restore  initial  relative  wage 
patterns.  Such  subsequent  adjustments  will lead to some effect  on wages 
from  lagged  unemployment.  But there  are two reasons  why this next step 
in the process  does not lead to acceleration. 
First, the need to restore relative  wages may be weak or even non- 
existent  in a position of Keynesian  unemployment.  In particular,  high- 
wage  firms  do not respond  to all cyclical  increases  in wages of low-wage 
firms.  The ability  of many wage-setting  firms  to expand  employment  at 
their  current  wage  implies  that  they need not chase  the first  relative  wage 
increase  upward.  Such  behavior  is consistent  with any  model  that accepts 
the presence  of unemployment  without  market-clearing  wage changes  in 
the first  place. 
Empirical  evidence shows that relative wages across some sectoral 
decompositions  of the economy  have drifted  apart  for extended  periods. 
I  found that the gap between low- and high-wage industries  closed 
throughout  the 1960s and confirmed  Wachter's  earlier finding of  a 
systematic  relation  between  the dispersion  of wage levels and the unem- 
ployment  rate.8 
Second, even if other wages do rise to restore the initial pattern  of 
relative  wages, those wages that increased  initially need not rise again 
to reopen  the initial  gap that  was needed  to gain employees.  The relative 
wage that a firm  pays when it needs to expand employment  should be 
higher  than the relative  wage needed to maintain  the new level. Main- 
taining  the new level simply  requires  avoiding  excessive  quits. To a first 
approximation,  this ought to require  only the relative  wage that sufficed 
7. Arthur M. Okun identified  such cyclical job improvement  as a major phenom- 
enon in the U.S. labor market  in his "Upward  Mobility in a High-pressure  Economy," 
BPEA, 1:1973, pp. 207-52. 
8. See Perry, "Slowing the Wage-Price Spiral";  and Michael L. Wachter, "The 
Wage Process: An Analysis of the Early 1970s,"  BPEA, 2:1974, pp. 507-24. 214  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
at the firm's  initial  employment  level. Thus catch-up  of other  wages,  with 
the new lower  unemployment  rate  maintained,  would not in turn  require 
a corresponding  further  increase  of the wages  that rose initially. 
In principle,  the cyclical wage behavior  in the simple deterministic 
model  I have  just described  not only is stable  rather  than accelerationist, 
but eventually  is not inflationary  at all so long as the economy  remains 
within  the region of Keynesian  unemployment.  Some relative  wage ad- 
justments  propagate  the initial  wage  increase  for a while, and  these  effects 
may  be quantitatively  important.  But analytically,  they disappear  in time. 
The further  elaboration  of the cyclical story depends  on the stochas- 
tic nature  of demand  among  sectors  that Tobin has emphasized.9  Even 
if total employment  does not change,  shifting  demand  leads to the need 
to expand employment  in some sectors while it is declining  in others. 
If firms operated  in auction-like  markets  with flexible wages, the em- 
ployment  loss of one firm  would just offset the gain of another,  and the 
pressure  of the two on the common  auction-market  wage would also be 
offset.  But in contract  markets,  that symmetry  does not hold. Expanding 
firms  may increase  wages to attract  employment,  while their declining 
counterparts  hold the line on wages and reduce employment  through 
normal attrition  or layoffs. Through such an asymmetry  the constant 
shifting  of demand  can keep wage inflation  alive, even confining  our at- 
tention  to the cyclical  part of the model, and still ignoring  the effects  of 
the wage norm. 
The mechanism  just described  makes wage changes, w, depend on 
both the rate of unemployment,  U, and the change  in employment,  e, or 
on unemployment  relative  to that  rate.  The pool of workers  available  to a 
firm  that wants to expand  employment  is proportional  to, although  not 
limited  to, the unemployed.  If the optimal  wage increase  depends  on the 
employment  increase  desired as a fraction  of the available  labor pool, 
the wage behavior  for the typical firm that needs to attract  additional 
workers  is given  by 
Wi  =f(t 
where  here and throughout  this paper  variables  in lowercase  letters are 
percentage  changes,  and  the i subscript  indicates  a disaggregated  variable. 
When this relation  is aggregated,  if total employment  does not deviate 
9.  Tobin, "Inflation  and Unemployment." George  L. Perry  215 
from a trend,  the expected  sum  of the e, will not contribute  to explaining 
the variance  in w, and the familiar  aggregate  relationship  between  wage 
changes  and  the inverse  of the unemployment  rate emerges: 
w  =  9 
If total employment  and unemployment  change,  the part of the sum of 
the e, that  departs  from  trend  will appear  when  the responses  of firms  are 
aggregated  so that the change  in employment  or unemployment  relative 
to the level of unemployment  will be an additional  determinant  of aggre- 
gate  wage changes: 
w  =h  /l  AU\ 
It would seem natural  to test the importance  of employment  changes 
in the cyclical inflation  process using disaggregated  data. However, if 
firms  hire new workers  into the bottom part of wage scales, the firms' 
average  wage  may decline  when employment  expands  even if their  wage 
offers  are raised  at every  point in their  wage scales. This possibility  also 
introduces  a problem  for estimation  with aggregates.  Furthermore,  if em- 
ployment  varies primarily  in high-wage  durable  goods industries  while 
the wage pressure  is created  in other industries  paying  lower wages, the 
connection  between  employment  changes  and wage changes  at the firm 
or industry  level will be lost or even appear  perverse.  This problem  will 
not appear  in aggregate  analysis explaining  a wage index adjusted  for 
relative  industry  shifts because aggregate  employment  increases  will be 
properly  correlated  with wage increases. 
THE  WAGE  NORM 
The cyclical  model  outlined  above  explains  all the Phillips  curve  char- 
acteristics  of the economy but only a part of the inflation  story. The 
other part comes from what I once called the "habitual"  rate of wage 
increase.  I now prefer  Okun's  term of the "norm"  rate of wage increase 
because  it conveys  the idea of a standard  that can be affected  by a range 
of developments  and not simply  by what has become habitual,  although 
that is bound  to be a major  part of it. The observed  behavior  of wages 
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ciated  with the norm  and the relative  wage changes  associated  with ad- 
justing  employment  in response  to firms'  demand  for labor. 
This distinction  between  the two forces  acting  on nominal  wages  is not 
just a way of splitting  one process underlying  wage behavior  into two 
parts. The cyclical mechanism  describes  the response of wages to the 
state of labor market  tightness  and to changes  in real demand among 
sectors  and  in the aggregate.  All the allocative  functions  of wage changes 
are included  in that mechanism.  The norm describes  the trend of wage 
behavior  independent  of these real demand  effects.  Keeping  up with the 
norm  is the neutral  standard  expected  under the implicit  contracts  that 
dominate  wage setting.  And keeping  up with the norm  is the allocatively 
neutral  wage strategy  for individual  firms;  it neither  improves  nor wors- 
ens their  positions  as employers. 
When the norm and cyclical mechanisms  are combined, the total 
effect  on wage inflation  will depend  on how the norm  responds  to actual 
wage developments.  But some analytic  properties  can be inferred  with- 
out fully specifying  that response. 
Distinguishing  the norm  from cyclical  effects  on wages  does not imply 
that  the norm  is insulated  from  the effects  of demand.  The norm  for wage 
increases  is at least partly  an adaptive  response  to past rates  of wage in- 
crease.  Thus a sustained  wage inflation  that arises  from reducing  unem- 
ployment  will eventually  escalate the norm as it did in the late 1960s. 
But if the economy  is still in the region  of Keynesian  unemployment  so 
that the cyclical mechanism  is not accelerationist,  adding  the effects of 
the norm  will not make  the process  accelerationist. 
Once unemployment  has stabilized  at its new low level, the cyclical 
mechanism  predicts  that wage inflation,  apart  from the norm,  will grad- 
ually settle back to the stable rate generated  by stochastic  shifts in de- 
mand among firms. This stochastic component should itself generate 
only small, and possibly zero, average  rates of wage increase. Actual 
wage inflation  will gravitate  to the sum of this low rate and the new 
higher  norm  resulting  from  the actual  wage  inflation  that  was experienced 
as unemployment  declined.  The part of average  wage increases  coming 
from the stochastic  component  does not gradually  feed into the norm 
and escalate  it further,  because  all firms  and sectors  take turns  at raising 
their  relative  wages  in this stochastic  process. 
In actual  experience  the effects  of the norm  and of changes  in the norm 
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Especially  if it takes  some time for changes  in the norm  rate of wage in- 
crease  to permeate  wage setting  throughout  the economy,  the data will 
not be able to sort out accurately  the separate  influences  on wages. A 
transition  to a new norm for wage increases  will be hard to track. But 
when  it is completed,  the cyclical  response  of wages  should  be observable 
around  the new norm. 
The interaction  of the norm and cyclical effects can contribute  to 
ratcheting  up inflation  over  time.  Firms  that  value  long-term  employment 
relationships  have a stake  in being  known as "a good place to work."  In 
setting  wages,  such  firms  may  be more anxious  about  missing  an increase 
in the wage norm  than about responding  too slowly to a decrease.  Be- 
cause the norm  will turn  out to be what the aggregate  of firms  makes  it 
through  their own behavior,  it thus may rise with cyclical expansions 
more  readily  than  it falls with cyclical  contractions. 
ESTABLISHING  THE  NORM 
In empirical  work, both my own and that of most others,  the inertia 
in inflation  has generally  been estimated  through a lagged dependent 
variable.  One problem  this can produce  is discussed  below in connection 
with estimating  a natural  unemployment  rate. For the model presented 
here, this procedure  implies a continuous  adjustment  of the wage norm 
to actual  wage changes  and to nothing  else. And that implication  is in- 
consistent  with the sharp  discontinuities  between  estimates  of the effect 
of the lagged  dependent  variable  in regression  equations  that end in the 
1960s and  those  that end in the 1970s. This difficulty  in using  the lagged 
dependent  variable  is predicted  by the present  model in which changes 
in the norm  are episodic  rather  than continuous,  and in which  the norm 
can  be affected  by other  developments  besides  past  wage changes. 
One reason for a more complicated  relation is that wage develop- 
ments  that are part  of the normal  cyclical  pattern  of relative  wages may 
have  little  effect  on the norm.  Wage  inflation  in high-wage  industries  may 
be largely  unaffected  by the speedup  in wages  in low-wage  industries  that 
occurs  in cyclical  upswings.  It may also be unaffected  by changes  in the 
minimum  wage. Conversely,  the pay in low-wage  sectors  may be largely 
unaffected  by increases  that major  unions obtain. In general,  some sys- 
tematic  changes  in relative  wage levels are part  of the cyclical  story.  But 
they  will influence  the norm  rate  of wage  inflation  only as they contribute 
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Another  reason  for believing  the norm is not related  in a simple  way 
to actual  wage changes  is that brief departures  of actual  wages from the 
prevailing  norm do not seem to matter. Before the 1970s, a cyclical 
Phillips  curve  reflecting  a wage norm  roughly  consistent  with price  infla- 
tion of 1 percent  explained  wages adequately.  As I suggest  below, one 
can improve  the fit slightly  by allowing  for a downward  shift  in the norm 
between  the 1950s and the 1960s. But any such shift must have been 
small. And judging  from how well simple Phillips curves fit the late 
1960s, the norm changed  only gradually,  if at all, for several  years after 
actual inflation  became a prominent  fact in the middle of the decade. 
Finally,  the wage explosion  that followed  the end of controls  in the first 
quarter  of 1974 did not become a new norm  for wages. 
The norm  may also be affected  by price  changes  that are independent 
of wage changes.  The implicit  contracts  that govern  wage setting  may  be 
influenced  by the path of real wages even if the cyclical response of 
wages to demand  is entirely  a relation  in terms of nominal  wages as I 
have modeled it here. Thus, although  the exogenous price explosions 
arising  from the two OPEC price increases  of the 1970s did not pass 
promptly  or fully into wage inflation,  the considerable  deterioration  of 
real wage gains  that resulted  may have gradually  lifted the norm  rate of 
wage increase  above what it would have been otherwise. 
Finally,  the norm  may be influenced  by direct  policies of the govern- 
ment such as wage guideposts,  controls, or standards  associated  with 
reward or penalty schemes of various tax-based incomes policies. In 
principle,  the norm may also be responsive  to credible  policies affecting 
expectations  of future  wage changes  along  the lines that William  Fellner 
has advocated.'0  The norm  undoubtedly  reflects  expectations  of the rate 
of wage inflation  throughout  the economy;  but in the normal  course of 
things,  those expectations  are formed  largely  on the basis of experienced 
inflation,  not pronouncements  about aggregate  demand  policy. In gen- 
eral, because  it is a force acting  on wage inflation  that is separate  from 
the cyclical  forces of demand,  any programs  to change  the norm  directly 
while also allowing  for relative  wage changes  around  the norm  can oper- 
ate  without  distorting  any  allocative  functions  of the wage-setting  process. 
Guideposts  linked to  tax-based incomes policies have this desirable 
characteristic. 
10. William Fellner, Toivards  a Reconstrutction  of Macroeconomics:  Problems of 
Theory  and Policy (American Enterprise  Institute, 1976), pp. 116-18. George  L. Perry  219 
Inflation  and  the Natural  Rate 
The inflation  process  I have described  operates  without  reference  to 
a natural  rate of unemployment.  A natural  unemployment  rate is one 
characteristic  of classical equilibrium.  And acceleration  of inflation  at 
unemployment  rates  below the natural  rate is a central  characteristic  of 
new classical  theories.  But these concepts  have also been used widely  to 
describe  developments  of the 1970s by economists  who do not accept 
the macroeconomics  described  by those theories. The concepts have 
been tacked  onto empirical  Phillips curve models without any rigorous 
derivation  of how they fit in or why they  belong  there. 
In particular,  it has become commonplace  to  assume that lagged 
inflation  enters  a Phillips  curve equation  with a coefficient  of 1.0 and to 
identify  the natural  rate of unemployment,  U, by solving constrained 
empirical  Phillips curves for the unemployment  rate that implies non- 
accelerating  inflation.  That is, if 
(1)  w =  Ao +  a,  +  lv_, 
the nonacceleratin,  inflation point, identified as the natural or non- 
accelerating  unemployment  rate,  is C =  -aJ/A0.  Furthermore,  from  the 
accelerationist  equation  1 and  the definition  of U it follows that 
(2)  w -  wi-  =  a,(  -  s) 
Thus  if wages  rise  faster  this  period  than  last, the economy  must  be in the 
accelerating  region and unemployment  must be below its natural  rate 
in these  models. 
None of these  properties  fits easily  into a mainline  model  with  Keynes- 
ian  unemployment.  The inflation  model  developed  in this  paper  generates 
inflation,  but not automatic  acceleration,  over a range  of unemployment 
rates.  And it identifies  this inflation  with the process  of declining  unem- 
ployment  as well as with a maintained  level. In this model, inflation  can 
exist and can be faster this period than last without indicating  that a 
crucial  unemployment  rate  has been passed  or that  inflation  will continue 
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The 1970s 
The inflation  story  during  much of the 1970s comes from outside  the 
general  model of wage changes  I have outlined.  Control,  decontrol,  and 
explosive  increases  in food and fuel prices  are exogenous  to the cyclical 
inflation  process and to the existing  wage norm. Before presenting  em- 
pirical  estimates  of the wage model, I first describe  the major  develop- 
ments  of the period  and suggest  how the norm  may have been changing 
in these  years. 
LEAVING  THE  1960s  PHILLIPS  CURVE 
The 1970s began with aggregate  wage inflation  running  well above 
the rate predicted  by the Phillips  curve that had fit so well through  the 
previous  two decades.  This failure  of wages to decelerate  as unemploy- 
ment rose had two elements. Wages set in major union negotiations 
accelerated  sharply;  and the norm for wage setting elsewhere in the 
economy adapted to an environment  of chronic inflation. These two 
elements  undoubtedly  reinforced  each other. But the behavior  of union 
wages  was sufficiently  different  from that of other  wages that it is worth 
examining  separately. 
Table 1 summarizes  the wage developments  of the key transitional 
years, 1968-71.  The data on "other  wages"  was derived  by removing 
the impact of effective major union wage changes from the average 
hourly earnings  index."-  The special role of major  union wages in this 
period  stands  out clearly.  After rising  no faster  than other  wages during 
most of the 1960s, wage increases  under current  settlements  jumped  to 
9.3 percent  in 1969 and to 11.9 percent  and 11.7 percent  in 1970 and 
1971, respectively.  These settlements,  together  with larger  increases  in 
subsequent  years under the new contracts and bigger increases from 
11. The calculation is inexact because the relative importance  of effective union 
wage changes in the total wage bill can only be estimated.  Scale wages are available. 
The trend of average weekly hours was assumed to be forty. And trend employment 
was estimated to be 95 percent of workers covered by major union contracts. The 
major union wage bill calculated from these estimates was subtracted  from the total 
wage bill calculated for nonsupervisory  workers in the private nonfarm economy, 
adjusted  to remove cyclical fluctuations.  In 1970, within this aggregate  sector 28 per- 
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Table 1. Wage  and  Consumer  Price Inflation  in the Transitional  Years, 1968-71a 
Percent 
Measure  1968  1969  1970  1971 
Wages  in major  unions 
Current  settlements  7.4  9.3  11.9  11.7 
Effective  wage change  6.0  6.5  8.8  9.2 
Other  wagesb  7.3  7.0  5.8  6.3 
All wages  (average  hourly  earnings  index)  6.7  6.8  6.6  6.7 
Consumer  price  index  4.7  5.7  5.6  3.5 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Calculated  as percent changes from the fourth quarter  a year earlier. 
b. The increases  for "other wages" were obtained by removing the contribution of effective  wage changes 
in major unions from the increase in all wages given by the average hourly earniings  index, as described 
in text note 11. 
cost-of-living  adjustments  (COLAs), made  effective  union  wage changes 
about 3 percentage  points greater  than the average increase in other 
wages  in 1970 and 1971. 
In general,  union  wage changes  are not the main driving  force behind 
wage inflation.  There is no consensus about any systematic  causality 
either  to or from  unions  beyond  the immediate  effect  of union wages on 
other wages in the same firm or industry.12 During the 1950s, union 
wages rose faster than the average  for the economy. The union wage 
explosion  that began in 1969 came at the end of a decade of increases 
that were, by contrast,  no better  than average,  and that had slowed the 
historical  increase  in real  wages of major  unions.  But although  it may be 
explained  by past events and relationships,  this explosion happened  to 
take place during  the softening  labor market  conditions  of the 1970-71 
recession.  That  timing  helped offset  the slowdown  in average  wages that 
would have been expected from the recession, and may have helped 
pull up the wage  norm  for the economy. 
How much  the union wage explosion  influenced  other  wages in those 
years  is impossible  to say. Close ties exist  between  some union  wages  and 
the wages of nonunion  workers  in the same firms  and workers  in non- 
union firms  in the same industry.  The implicit contract  in these cases 
includes  an understanding  that particular  relative  wages will not get far 
out of line. If some allowance  is made for induced increases  in these 
12. See, for example, Robert J. Flanagan, "Wage  Interdependence  in Unionized 
Labor Markets,"  BPEA, 3:1976, pp. 635-73; and Daniel J. B. Mitchell, "Union  Wage 
Determination:  Policy Implications  and Outlook,"  BPEA, 3:1978, pp. 537-82. 222  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
Table  2. Wage  and  Consumer  Price Inflation  in the Era of Conitrols  and  Price 
Explosions,  1970:2-1975:1 
Annual  rate, in percent 
Before  During  coiitrols  After 
controls,  controls, 
Measure  1970:2-1971:2 1971:2-1972:4 1972:4-1974:1 1974:1-1975:1 
Average  hourly  earn- 
ings index  7.2  6.2  6.5  9.4 
Consumer  price  index  4.4  3.3  9.2  11.2 
Deflator  for personal 
consumption  expen- 
ditures  4.4  3.5  8.5  10.3 
Sources: The deflator for  personal consumption expenditures is from the U.S.  Bureau of  Economic 
Analysis. The other series are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
closely related  wages, the balance  of wages slows even further  than the 
"other  wages"  in table 1. Even so, it is doubtful  that the balance  would 
have been predicted  from earlier  relationships.  The estimate  for "other 
wages"  in table 1 decelerated  by only 0.7 percentage  point  between  1969 
and 1971, despite  the abrupt  slowing  of wages  by controls  in the second 
half of 1971. 
From this evidence it is clear that the norm for wage changes had 
risen by the early 1970s. And it is likely that this rise in the norm was 
a response  both to the persistent  and growing  inflation  of the previous 
five years and to the explosion  of union wages that started  with the cur- 
rent settlements  of 1969. In 1971 the evidence  that inflation  was on a 
new higher  plateau  prompted  the Nixon administration  to invoke  a price- 
wage freeze and then comprehensive  controls  on wages and prices. 
CONTROLS  AND  THE  PRICE  EXPLOSIONS 
As table  2 shows,  the controls  clearly  decelerated  wages  and  the prices 
that  were subject  to controls.  In the year  before the wage-price  freeze  in 
the summer  of 1971, the average  hourly earnings  index had risen by 
7.2 percent  and the consumer  price  index and deflator  for personal  con- 
sumption  expenditures  by 4.4 percent.  All three  indexes  slowed  by about 
1 percentage  point during  the first six quarters  of controls through  the 
end of 1972. Although these broad indexes show that controls slowed 
wages  and prices  in parallel  over these intervals,  Robert  Gordon's  more George L. Perry  223 
detailed  analysis  indicates  that they slightly  squeezed  prices relative to 
wages.13 
At the start  of 1973, and again  in 1974, food prices  rose sharply  as a 
consequence  of low inventories  and  poor worldwide  crops.  In the second 
half of 1973, the OPEC cartel drastically  raised oil prices. These twin 
exogenous  price shocks sent the price averages  soaring;  by early 1974, 
the CPI  was rising  at double-digit  rates.  In this environment  the controls 
program  was abandoned  and prices and wages throughout  the economy 
accelerated  sharply. 
This episode  confirmed  the judgment  of many  that controls  can only 
suppress  inflation  and that any deceleration  achieved by controls will 
bring  an offsetting  acceleration  when  they are  lifted.  This judgment  is not 
inevitable  in theory. Controls  or other forms of restraint  can slow the 
wage norm  without  distorting  relative  prices or wages. And, in practice, 
the judgment  is not confirmed  by all instances  when controls  have been 
used. When controls  were lifted in 1953, no price-wage  explosion fol- 
lowed despite  a relatively  low unemployment  rate. 
In 1974, controls  were abandoned  because intense inflationary  pres- 
sure from uncontrolled  sectors made them politically  untenable.  Most 
importantly,  the CPI had been rising at double-digit  rates for several 
months  because  of food and  fuel prices,  and  real wages  for most workers 
were declining  rapidly.  Implicit  wage contracts  throughout  the economy 
were  being  strained.  And an attempt  at relief through  higher  wages was 
inevitable  once the end of controls  made it legal. If controls  had never 
been in place, the acceleration  of wages and other prices would simply 
have started  sooner. 
THE  LATE  1970s 
The economy apparently  came out of the postcontrol  catch-up and 
the deep recession  of 1974-75  with a norm rate of wage increase of 
perhaps  8 percent  a year.  Although  unemployment  remained  high in the 
first years of recovery,  actual wage inflation  crept higher each year of 
recovery  until the wage-price  restraint  program  with its 7 percent  wage 
guidelines  was begun  in late 1978. 
As  table 3  shows, increases in  current settlements among major 
13. Robert J. Gordon, "Wage-Price  Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve," 
BPEA, 2:1972, pp. 385-421. 224  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
Table  3. Wage  and  Consumer  Price Inflation,  1976-79a 
Percent 
Measure  1976  1977  1978  1979 
Wages  in major  unions 
Current  settlements  8.5  7.7  7.8  7.9 
Effective  wage change  8.1  8.0  8.2  9.1 
All wages (average  hourly  earnings  index)  7.3  7.5  8.4  8.1 
Consumer  price  index  5.0  6.7  9.0  12.7 
Deflator  for personal  consumption 
expenditures  4.8  5.7  7.5  9.9 
Source: Same as table 2. 
a.  Calculated as percent changes from the fourth quarter  a year earlier. 
unions slowed after 1976, when the last round of three-year  contracts 
signed  during  the controls  period  were  renegotiated.  But widespread  and 
more complete  COLAs kept effective  wage gains above 8 percent.  The 
CPI accelerated  more than average  hourly earnings  between 1976 and 
1978, and rose much faster  in 1979 when first  food prices and then oil 
prices and mortgage  interest  rates  climbed  sharply. 
The second  big ratchet  in OPEC  prices  was even larger  than the first 
one that occurred  five years  earlier,  and its impact  on U.S. energy  prices 
is now compounded  by the decontrol  of oil prices. In October 1979 a 
wage restraint  program  was once more virtually  abandoned  under the 
political strain  of large increases  in uncontrolled  prices. Since that re- 
laxation  of the wage standard,  wages have accelerated  substantially;  by 
March 1980 they were 8.8 percent above levels of a year earlier.  The 
1978-80  acceleration  in the CPI may have moved the wage norm up 
another  notch  by the end of the decade. 
THE  1970s  AND  THE  PHILLIPS  CURVE 
I have argued  above that the norm rate of wage increase  drifted  up 
substantially  by the early 1970s in response to the actual inflation  of 
previous  years,  was suppressed  and possibly  reduced  by controls  during 
the next several  years, was ratcheted  upward  by the price explosions  of 
1973-74 and by the actual wage explosion that followed decontrol  in 
the spring  of 1974, and may now be moving upward  again as a result 
of the second OPEC oil price explosion and the escalation of union 
wages  with COLAs. George L. Perry  225 
Actual  wage changes,  as opposed  to the norm,  were affected  specifi- 
cally and with different  timing  by the impact of prices on wages when 
controls  were lifted, by the price increases  of 1978 and 1979, by the 
high  unemployment  during  and after  two recessions,  and by the controls 
early  in the decade  and  the wage  restraint  program  that  began  in October 
1978. 
Untypically,  major  union wages played a major  role in the behavior 
of economy-wide  wages during  the decade,  first  by escalating  during  the 
recession  of 1970-71 and subsequently  by transmitting  price increases 
to the wage  structure  through  COLAs  more  fully and directly  than  might 
have  happened  in their  absence.  But the exceptional  inflation  in the price 
indexes  that  has come from  rising  energy  prices  might  well have affected 
the norm increase  in wages even in the absence of unions and formal 
COLAs. 
Estimating  the Wage  Model 
A way of characterizing  changes  in the wage norm must be chosen 
for the purpose of estimating  the model of wage inflation. The con- 
ceptual discussion  of the norm provides some guidance  on what kind 
of  developments  might change the norm; and the discussion of  the 
1970s suggests  how specific  developments  may have affected  it. Rather 
than try to model changes  in the norm that conform closely to these 
known events, I have chosen the opposite course of allowing only for 
substantial  shifts in  the norm, treating it  as  constant for extended 
periods  of time. I do this by allowing  for a norm shift downward  after 
1961 and a second shift upward  starting  in 1970. 
The first shift allows for the cumulative  impact of two quick reces- 
sions separated  by only an abortive  recovery  in the 1958-61  period. 
It may  also capture  some effect  on the norm  from  the introduction  of the 
wage  guideposts  under  President  Kennedy,  although  the intense  applica- 
tion of the guideposts  did not occur  until 1964 under  President  Johnson 
and  is treated  separately.  The second shift allows  for the cumulative  im- 
pact  of the sustained  inflation  of the last half of the 1960s. Each of these 
shifts  is modeled  by a dummy  variable  that  is 1.0 throughout  the relevant 
period  and  zero otherwise.  Obviously  the norm  did not shift so abruptly, 
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of the concept  to explain  the data.  Yet even this crude  representation  is 
superior  to a continuous  adaptive  scheme: it is evidence  in favor of the 
norm  concept  that  lagged  wage  changes  were  insignificant  when added  to 
any of the regression  equations  that use the two norm  shifts. 
Three kinds of response from the cyclical part of the model are 
mixed in the data: effects  from the level of unemployment,  effects  from 
the change in unemployment,  and possibly some short lags in relative 
wage adjustments.  Both current  and one-quarter  lagged values of 1/U 
are used in the equations  of table 4. The expected sign on the lagged 
value is negative  because declining  unemployment  leads to faster  wage 
increases  in the model.  If there  is some  lag in the effect  of the unemploy- 
ment  level on wages, it will interfere  with identifying  this separate  effect 
from changing  unemployment.  In table 5, I report  equations  that impose 
a relative  lag structure  of 1.00, 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25 on successive  past 
values of 1/U,  starting  with the current  quarter.  Those equations  use 
AU/U to capture  the effect of changes  in unemployment. 
Demographic  effects on unemployment  are allowed for by using a 
demographically  weighted unemployment  rate throughout.  The possi- 
bility that the Phillips  curve  rotated  in the 1970s is also explored  using 
a shift dummy  on the unemployment  rates for that period.14  The equa- 
tions incorporate  a direct effect of cost-of-living  adjustments  on wage 
changes by adding the four-quarter  change in the CPI, lagged one 
quarter. 
Finally, the effects of guideposts  under President  Johnson and con- 
trols under  President  Nixon are estimated  in the equations.  The guide- 
posts are modeled  by a dummy  variable  from 1964:1 to 1966:2; after 
that the airline mechanics  settlement  broke the wage standard,  which 
then became ineffective  in other settlements  as well. As the preceding 
discussion  of the 1970s indicates,  the period of Nixon controls  and the 
first  year  of decontrol  cannot  be explained  well or even handled  properly 
by a simple  dummy  variable.  I thus simply  dropped  the quarters  for the 
1971:3-1975:1 period  from  the equations  reported  below. I also include 
equations  in which the entire 1970:1-1975:1  period is omitted.  These 
avoid both the control-decontrol  period and also the early 1970s when 
the norm  may have been in the process  of drifting  upward. 
14. In the table 4 equations  the coefficient  on 1/ U was systematically  about twice 
as large as the (negative) coefficient  on 1  /U-_. So the possibility of a flattening  in the 
Phillips curve was explored using the shift dummy (2D/U  -  D/U-),  where D is George  L. Perry  227 
Empirical  Results 
The one feature  of the estimates  that is most sensitive  to which  period 
is included  in the equations  is the size of the cyclical  response  to unem- 
ployment  in the 1970s. When  only the quarters  of controls  and decontrol 
are  removed  from  that  decade,  as in equations  4-4 and 4-5, the estimated 
effects from unemployment  are changed substantially.  Compared  with 
equation  4-3 estimated  through  1969, 4-4 indicates  a larger  response  of 
wages to unemployment  in those years. Equation  4-5, which drops the 
slope shift dummy, indicates a larger response throughout  the entire 
period,  and a substantially  smaller  norm shift in the 1970s. It turns  out 
that  the crucial  quarters  are the early 1970s. When  these are eliminated, 
the estimated  effects  of unemployment  are much more consistent. 
During  the early 1970s the transition  to a higher norm was taking 
place  while  the economy  was in recession.  One interpretation  of the esti- 
mates  in 4-4 is that, in order  to fit this transition  period, the two shift 
effects  from  the norm  and the slope are both overestimated,  but with off- 
setting  effects  on predicted  wages. When the transition  quarters  of the 
early 1970s are dropped  in 4-6, the slope shift becomes insignificant. 
And 4-7, in which  the slope shift does not appear,  shows a response  of 
wages  to unemployment  that is similar  to the estimates  of 4-3. 
Table 5 also supports  this interpretation  of the early 1970s. When 
the transition  quarters  are included  in 5-2, the slope shift term entirely 
eliminates  any  effect  from  the level of unemployment  in the 1970s. When 
the transition  quarters  are dropped  in 5-3, the slope shift becomes in- 
significant  and  unemployment  effects  are similar  to those in 5-1. 
The effects  of changes  in unemployment,  as opposed to its level, are 
necessarily  better  defined  in table 5, which constrains  the level to enter 
with some lag effects. However, the size of the level effect is similar 
when  one compares  5-4 and 4-7 or 5-1 and 4-3. 
The estimated  effects  of lagged consumer  prices decline somewhat  as 
the period  is extended.  Although  this variable  is intended  to capture  the 
direct  effect  of the CPI  through  explicit  or implicit  escalators,  in the early 
1.0 for the 1970s and zero otherwise. In table 5 the slope change is explored with a 
shift dummy  of the form D/U.  I also explored whether the unemployment  relation 
might have changed  in a way described  by 1/(U  +  D)  with similar results to those 
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years of the sample  period it also appears  to be capturing  some other 
feature  of wage adjustments.  Equations  4-1 and 4-2 are dominated  by 
cyclical swings  in unemployment  far more than the equations  fitted to 
longer  periods.  If the lagged CPI captures  some structural  lag in wage 
adjustments  as well as escalator effects, its estimated  effect might be 
larger  in the equations  dominated  by these early  years.  It is unfortunate 
that the equations  cannot  capture  the very short-term  cyclical response 
of wages convincingly  because there are not enough cyclical turning 
points  in the data  for the later  years. 
The estimated  decline  in the CPI coefficient  between  4-3 and 4-7 may 
be partly due to the effect just discussed.  But I can also think of two 
reasons  for such a decline  that have to do with the direct  effect of esca- 
lators on wages. Although  among  major  unions indexing  became more 
widespread  and, for modest inflation  rates, more complete during  the 
1970s, the proportion of  wages covered by  major union contracts 
dropped  during  the decade.  Furthermore,  most escalators  are capped  so 
that  the very  rapid  rise in the CPI in the past  few years  was only partially 
passed  onto wages  through  this avenue. 
The indicated  norm shifts from either 4-7 or 5-4 are a decline of 
about  0.8 percentage  point after  1961 and  an increase  of about  3.5 points 
by the late 1970s. In 4-1 and 4-2 ending  in earlier  years, the first shift 
is estimated  to be smaller,  so its size is not as well established.  However, 
the substantial  shift up by the late 1970s is well established  and is con- 
sistent  with the model and the description  of the period.  The lagged  de- 
pendent  variable,  which could represent  a continuous  process  by which 
the norm is established,  is not significant  when added to any of the 
equations. And the money supply, tried with several alternative  lag 
structures,  is not significant  either,  indicating  that the norm shift cannot 
be given a simple  monetarist  interpretation.  These results  generally  sup- 
port the description  of the norm  developed  in the present  model and in 
the discussion  of the 1970s. 
Simulating  Wage Inflation 
In table 6 the response  of wage inflation  to a deep recession  is simu- 
lated using  equation  4-7. The simulations  begin with wage inflation  con- 
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Table 6. Simulations  of Wage  Inflation  with  Recession 
Sustained  recession  Recession  and recovery 
Rate of wage  inflationa  Rate of wage inflationa 
Unemploy-  Without  With  Unemnploy-  Without  With 
Quarter  ment  rateb  norm  shift norm  shift  ment rateb  norm  shlift  norm  shlift 
0  5.7  9.2  9.2  5.7  9.2  9.2 
4  7.9  8.3  8.3  7.9  8.3  8.3 
8  9.0  8.0  8.0  8.6  8.1  8.1 
12  9.0  8.0  7.3  7.7  8.4  7.8 
16  9.0  8.0  6.3  6.8  8.7  7.5 
20  9.0  8.0  4.6  5.9  9.2  7.1 
Source: Derived by author from equation 4-7 in table 4. For details of  the simnulations,  see text dis- 
cussion. 
a.  The rates of wage inflation are from changes in logs, expressed at annual rates. 
b. The weighted unemploymenit  rate was used in the simulatioiis. It is expressed here in terms of its 
equivalent official rate. 
These are the actual  rates  of 1980:  1, although  not of previous  quarters. 
Variations  in the CPI are assumed  to equal variations  in wage inflation 
during  the simulations. 
In the recession  and recovery  scenario,  unemployment  rises steadily 
by 3.3 points (3.0 points of weighted  unemployment)  during  the first 
six quarters  and then declines  by 0.2 point of weighted  unemployment 
a quarter.  Without  a norm shift, wage inflation  declines temporarily  to 
8.1 percent  and is back to 9.2 percent  after  five years. With unemploy- 
ment  maintained  at 9.0 percent  in the sustained  recession,  wage inflation 
levels off at a rate  of 8.0 percent. 
Especially  in the case of sustained  recession,  the model of this paper 
would  predict  an eventual  downward  shift in the norm.  The simulations 
assume  the following  response  of the norm  to actual  wage developments 
in order  to illustrate  that kind of development:  the norm  shifts down by 
one-half  the change  in the rate  of wage  inflation  after  two years,  by three- 
fourths  of the change  in the rate after  three  years,  and  by the full change 
in the rate after  four years. With sustained  recession,  these norm shifts 
reduce  wage  inflation  to a rate  of 4.6 percent  after  five years.  If the norm 
remains  at its new rate during  a subsequent  gradual  recovery  in which 
the weighted  unemployment  rate is reduced  by 0.2 point a quarter,  the 
rate of wage inflation  would gradually  rise again to about 6 percent  as 
unemployment  returned  to 5.7 percent over a three-and-one-half  year 
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in the  recession  and  recovery  scenario,  wage  inflation  levels off at 7.2 per- 
cent  by the time  the initial  unemployment  rate  is restored. 
The norm  shifts  assumed  here are conjectural.  Especially  in the reces- 
sion  and  recovery  scenario,  the  norm  might  not shift  as much  as indicated. 
And nothing  in the past behavior  of wages suggests  the improvements  in 
the norm assumed  here are excessively  pessimistic.  Unemployment  rose 
by more  than  4.0 percentage  points  in the recession  of 1973-75, and the 
subsequent  recovery  was about as fast as assumed  here. Yet wage infla- 
tion was worse at the end of the period  than it was at the beginning.  Of 
course, as I argued  above, the price explosions of 1973-74  may have 
pushed  up the norm,  thus  working  against  the effects  of slack  in that  case. 
The cyclical  response  of wages  to slack demand  and rising  unemploy- 
ment is weak and makes  a policy of holding  back demand  an extremely 
costly,  if not futile,  way to reduce  inflation.  If slack  is not sustained  so as 
to reduce  the norm,  recession  leads  to only a small  and temporary  reduc- 
tion in inflation.  And the plausible  norm  shift that is modeled  here slows 
inflation  only at a very great  cost in real economic  performance.  In the 
sustained  recession  scenario,  in addition  to the high current  cost of ex- 
tended  slack, investment  incentives  for business  and employment  oppor- 
tunities  for young workers  would deteriorate  badly, eroding  the human 
and physical  capital  on which  productivity  depends.  Any attempt  to cure 
inflation  must obviously count on the norm shifting  favorably.  An in- 
comes policy of some form holds out the hope of shifting  it at a more 
tolerable  cost. 
Rational  Expectations  and Monetarism 
The model I have presented  relates  inflation  to the established  frame- 
work for analyzing  real economic activity. The inflation of the past 
decade  has also been discussed  in the context  of some professional  litera- 
ture that is very different  in its approach.  One part of that literature  is 
monetarist  and centers on the proposition  that inflation  is simply the 
result  of excessive  growth  in the money  supply.  Another,  more extensive, 
part of that literature  has been called "new classical"  and centers on 
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THE  MONETARIST  INFLATION  MODEL 
Any macroeconomic  model will predict that faster growth of  the 
money supply  will lead to faster growth  of nominal  GNP, other things 
being equal.  To a first approximation,  any model will also predict  that 
real activity  is unaffected  by money in the long run. Simple monetarist 
models are distinctive  in asserting  that the growth  of money determines 
prices rather  than output even in the relatively short run; and, as a 
corollary,  that exogenous  price shocks such as those experienced  in the 
past decade  primarily  affect  relative  prices  rather  than the average  price 
level except  as they are accompanied  by monetary  accommodation. 
Equations  7-1 and 7-2 in table 7 present reduced-form  monetarist 
equations  based on quarterly  data for 1954-69  and 1954-79,  respec- 
tively, using the specification  suggested  recently  by John Tatom.15  The 
equations  appear  to support  monetarist  explanations  of inflation.  How- 
ever,  if even the simplest  standard  Phillips  curve  variables  are added,  as 
in equations  7-3 and 7-4, money  growth  contributes  nothing  to the equa- 
tion. Thus there is no evidence  that money growth  offers a shortcut  to 
disinflation  compared  with the model I have presented  above. 
Equation  7-4, which  is fit through  1979, is entirely  unsatisfactory  even 
allowing  for the norm shift. Only the lagged dependent  variable  is sig- 
nificant.  The equation  fails mainly  because  it makes  no allowance  for the 
price shocks  of the decade that I described  earlier  as exogenous.  When 
7-1 is used  to predict  the annual  rate  of inflation  in 1974, it underpredicts 
by an average  of 7.5 percentage  points. The errors from 7-2 for this 
period  average  5.0 percentage  points. 
RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  MODELS 
The new classical  models are often combined  with monetarism.  But 
their distinctive  feature  is a rejection  of the established  framework  for 
analyzing  the macroeconomy. 
The three  essential  parts  of the new classical  theory  are: the economy 
is a world  of auction-like  markets  with  flexible  prices  for both output  and 
15. John A. Tatom, "Does the Stage of the Business Cycle Affect the Inflation 
Rate?"  Review  of  the  St. Louis  Federal  Reserve  Bank,  vol.  60  (September  1978), 
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labor;  discrepancies  between  actual  and  expected  prices  and  wages  deter- 
mine  deviations  of real output  and employment  from  their  full or natural 
levels; and the relevant  price or wage expectations  are formed  in a ra- 
tional  manner. 
At the level of decisionmaking,  price-taking  firms  adjust  their output 
according  to whether  actual prices are above or below those they had 
expected.  They also transmit  this decision  into their demand  for labor. 
Workers  in turn  choose  to work  more  or less according  to whether  wages 
are above or below what they had expected.  Thus the prices and wages 
given  by the market,  relative  to those that had been expected,  determine 
output and employment  for the period. The connection between this 
model of behavior  and macroeconomics  comes in specifying  how both 
actual  prices and wages and expected  prices and wages are determined. 
The micro  model  then  tells how real decisions  are  made  given actual  and 
expected  inflation. 
To make these concepts operational  requires  some specification  of 
how these price and wage expectations  are formed.  Perfect  foresight  or 
unbiased  expectations  of inflation  would seem natural  assumptions.  But 
these  destroy  the model.  Perfect  foresight  means  real output  and employ- 
ment  would  never  deviate  from  trend,  for only unanticipated  prices  move 
real variables.  Unbiased expectations  would lead only to random and 
uncorrelated  deviations  of real variables  from  their trends. 
Models  with  rational  expectations  that  include  contracts  and  staggered 
wage  setting  can produce  more  realistic  output  and employment  paths  at 
the cost of rejecting  the market  assumptions  of the new classical  school.'6 
If lags  in perception  or in making  real adjustments  are  used to rationalize 
any degree  of departure  from  trend  in real  variables,  as Lucas  and  Sargent 
have  recently  done,  it is extremely  difficult  to distinguish  the new classical 
models  on the basis of how the economy  performs.17  Furthermore,  the 
point of these models for the central issue in the present  paper-how 
inflation  is related  to macroeconomic  performance-becomes obscured 
once the models  have so little to say empirically  about the division of 
nominal  GNP  into its price  and  output  components. 
16. See John B. Taylor, "Staggered  Wage Setting in a Macro Model," American 
Economic Review, vol. 69 (May 1979, Papers and Proceedings, 1978), pp. 108-18. 
17. See Robert E. Lucas and Thomas J. Sargent, "After Keynesian Macroeco- 
nomics,"  in Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, After thze  Phillips Curve:  Persistence  of 
High Inflation  and High Unemployment,  Conference Series, 19 (FRBB, 1978), pp. 
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Among  models  that are observable  and therefore  testable,  it has been 
suggested  that  the relevant  forecast  is equivalent  to the one from  the best 
econometric  model  of inflation  that  is available  at any time. It is unlikely 
such models  would display  the serially  correlated  errors  that are needed 
to explain  serially  correlated  real disturbances.  And as a model of the 
expectations  that governs individuals'  behavior, this view is curiously 
at the other  extreme  from  the more  plausible  assumption  that people are 
ill-informed  and somewhat  naive about these matters.  In fact, most of 
the new classical  literature  is tied to monetary  models of inflation,  which 
links them to monetarism.  This is where empirical  work centers.18  And 
this is the basis  for many  of the policy prescriptions  that  emerge  from  the 
new classical  literature. 
In new monetarist  models-the  new classical  models with money as 
the main determinant  of nominal GNP-the  expected rate of inflation 
is given  by expected  growth  of the money supply,  which can perhaps  be 
predicted  by past money growth.  Departures  of inflation  from the rates 
predicted  by money give rise to departures  of output and employment 
from their trends.  The existence  of only a weak and erratic  relation  be- 
tween money and prices  is essential  to the new monetarist  model;  if the 
relation  were too good, inflation  would be forecasted  correctly  and real 
variables  would  be unaffected  by money. 
The ability  of the new monetarist  models  to predict  output  and prices 
cannot  be tested without  having a specific  time series that distinguishes 
between expected and unexpected  movements  in money. Robert Barro 
has presented  some results  based on his own construction  of expected 
money.'9 However, Martin Baily has raised serious questions about 
Barro's  procedures  for constructing  his series  and  has shown  that  Barro's 
results  are more easily  understood  in terms  of conventional  models that 
do not attempt to divide money into expected and unexpected com- 
ponents.20 
Even if  a methodology for measuring  unanticipated  money were 
agreed  upon, it could not easily distinguish  the hypothesis  of the new 
18. The most intensive empirical  work has been done by Robert J. Barro.  See his 
"Unanticipated  Money, Output,  and the Price Level in the United States,"  Journal  of 
Political Economy, vol. 86 (August 1978), pp. 549-80. 
19. Barro,  "Unanticipated  Money." 
20.  Martin N. Baily, discussion of Michael L. Wachter and Susan M. Wachter, 
"Institutional  Factors in Domestic Inflation,"  in Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
Af  ter the Phillips Curve,  pp. 156-63. George L. Perry  237 
Table  8. Variance  of Inflation  and Growth  of Money  and  Nominal  and  Real GNP, 
by Decade, 1950-79a 
Percentage  points 
Measure  1950s  1960s  1970s 
Money growth 
One quarter  5.07  7.23  5.77 
Four quarters  2.82  4.48  1.72 
Eight quarters  2.39  2.71  0.92 
Nominal GNP growth 
One quarter  51.07  11.68  17.99 
Four quarters  27.27  4.90  6.58 
Eight quarters  21.57  1.96  4.28 
Inflation 
One quarter  9.14  2.10  7.64 
Four quarters  2.31  1.92  7.33 
Eight quarters  2.27  1.98  4.69 
Real GNP growth 
One quarter  32.34  9.34  20.88 
Four quarters  15.19  4.36  10.43 
Eight quarters  10.56  1.61  6.14 
Sources: The money supply is from the Board of Govrnors  of the Federal Reserve System. All other 
variables  are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, national income and product accounts. 
a.  The money supply measure is Mi.  Inflation is moasurcd by the chiange  in the deflator for personal 
consuimption  expenditures. The variances are calculated frolmi  percent changes of  the data, seasonally 
adjusted at ananual  rates. The variances of four- and eighnt-quarter  percent changes are calculated from 
nonoverlapping intervals. 
monetarists  from  others  so long as actual  and unanticipated  money  were 
correlated.  Most views of  the economy would predict variations in 
money  to be correlated  with variations  in output  and employment. 
To cope with this basic difficulty,  I have tried  to examine  some of the 
implications  of both old and  new monetarism  with simple,  unconstrained 
data.  Table 8 compares  the variance  in money  growth  with the variances 
in nominal  GNP growth,  price  inflation  (deflator  for personal  consump- 
tion expenditures),  and real GNP growth  for the decades  of the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s. The variances  are calculated  for growth rates over 
intervals  of one quarter,  four quarters,  and eight quarters. 
The common  prescription  of both old and new monetarism  is steady 
monetary  growth.  This prescription  reflects  the belief that active mone- 
tary  policy causes  more problems  than it solves. Indeed, most shocks  to 
nominal  demand  and prices  are argued  to come from mistakes  of mone- 
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equations  and  little  predictive  power  for short-run  variations  in inflation, 
maintaining  steady  growth  of money is expected  to stabilize  the growth 
of nominal  GNP, output, and prices. The variances  in table 8 lend no 
support to these prescriptions.  Compared  with the  1950s or  1970s, 
the variance  of money growth  in the 1960s is greater  for each interval 
over which it is calculated;  yet this decade experienced  the lowest vari- 
ances  in all measures  of economic  performance. 
In the 1970s the variance  of inflation  is much  greater  than  the variance 
of money  growth.  This comparison  is consistent  with the view that there 
was less monetary  accommodation  of price shocks in the 1970s than in 
the earlier  periods,  but not with the view that price changes  were due to 
monetary  shocks. On either old monetarist  or new monetarist  grounds, 
prices  cannot  be blamed  on money  if the variance  of prices  is greater  than 
the variance  of money.  The latter  is extremely  low in this decade. 
The new classical  theory can also be interpreted  without an explicit 
tie to money.  In this case, the model predicts  that the variance  of prices 
and output  should  depend  on the division  of nominal  GNP into expected 
and unexpected  components.  If all the variance  of nominal  GNP is ex- 
pected,  the variance  of real output  will be minimized  and the variance  of 
prices will be at a maximum  for the given total variation  of nominal 
GNP. In this case, the covariance  between  real output  and prices  will be 
near zero. 
The difference  between  the variance  of nominal  GNP and the sum of 
the variance  of real GNP and prices measures  twice the covariance  be- 
tween  real GNP and prices.  For the 1950s this covariance  was large and 
positive,  ranging  from  4.4 to 4.9 for the three  intervals.  This is consistent 
with the cyclical model I presented  earlier  or with a new classical  view 
that much of  the nominal GNP variation was unanticipated.  In the 
1970s the covariance  is large and negative,  ranging  from -3.3  to -5.6 
for the three  intervals.  This suggests  the price  performance  of that decade 
was dominated  by the shocks  to prices  and real activity  described  earlier. 
The most interesting  case is the 1960s, for which the covariance  be- 
tween  inflation  and real growth  was near  zero. In terms  of the new classi- 
cal models, this means nominal  GNP growth  was largely anticipated  in 
this decade,  an inference  that  is supported  by the low variance  of nominal 
GNP itself. In turn this means real economic activity  stayed around  its 
equilibrium  trend, and the dramatic  decline in unemployment  through- George  L. Perry  239 
out the decade  corresponded  to a steady  decline  in the natural  unemploy- 
ment rate in these models.  To be relevant,  the concept  of a natural  un- 
employment  rate  must  be largely  invariant  to changes  in demand;  it must 
be a structural  characteristic  of the economy, reflecting  basic determi- 
nants  of individuals'  labor supply  and how the job market  is organized 
and functions.  There  is little that is distinctive  or informative  in the new 
classical  models  if the dramatic  change  in actual  unemployment  that  took 
place during  the 1960s is simply  relabeled  a decline  in the natural  rate. 
Dealing  with  Inflation 
I conclude  that neither  old monetarist  nor new classical models im- 
prove the understanding  of inflation  provided  by the model that I out- 
lined and estimated  in the first part of this paper. According to that 
model,  the dismal  record  of the "discomfort  index" (the sum of the un- 
employment  rate and the inflation rate) in recent years arises from 
exogenous  price shocks and a large shift upward  in the inflation  norm. 
The benefits  of changing  an established  inflation  norm are  hardly  well 
established  in economic  theory.  However,  common  sense suggests  where 
all the risks  and  uncertainties  lie. The political  commitment  to slow infla- 
tion is not only clear but, costs aside, undoubtedly  well founded.  If the 
inflation  norm can be slowed at little cost, we should certainly  do so. 
What  are the possibilities  for slowing  the norm? 
1.  Maintain  high  unemployment.  This  promises  the  anti-inflation 
effect  predicted  by the cyclical Phillips curve, and by lowering experi- 
enced  inflation,  an eventual  shift  down  in the norm. 
2.  Sustain tight fiscal and monetary policy.  This produces  (1).  But 
proponents  believe  it offers  a better  payoff  than ( 1  ) implies  because  they 
believe  that  policies  act on inflation  directly  rather  than  just  through  their 
effects  in creating  economic  slack. 
3.  Announce and stick  to  a  credible restrictive policy.  Proponents 
believe  this offers  a faster and better payoff than (2)  because expecta- 
tions  of policy  actions  affect  wages  and  prices. 
4.  Reduce prices relative to wages (without squeezing normal mar- 
gins). These  policies depend  on the wage norm being affected  by actual 
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5.  Provide incentives to wage and price moderation. The broad range 
of tax-based  incomes  policies is included  here. 
6.  Slow wages and prices by decree. This includes the range of direct 
restraints  on wage  and  price  behavior  from  guideposts  through  thorough- 
going  controls. 
I discussed  the estimated  costs and  benefits  of the high  unemployment 
strategy  (1)  when I presented  the simulations  of table 6. I find no evi- 
dence that these costs and benefits  are any different  because  of the par- 
ticular  policies pursued (2).  In particular,  the analysis  of money pre- 
sented  above  reaffirms  that  money  has no independent  effect  on inflation. 
The credibility  hypothesis  (3)  that Fellner emphasizes  is a different 
matter.  It remains  unprovable  and I remain skeptical.  I view it as an 
attempt  to shift down the inflation  norm.  Because  the norm is movable, 
it is an appropriate  goal, consistent  with the description  of the inflation 
process that I have outlined. However, there is no evidence that the 
norm  would respond  to policy pronouncements.  Wage setters  might  not 
respond, either because it is impossible  to make such pronouncements 
credible  or because  they would ignore  them even if they were believed, 
waiting  instead for actual developments  to change  before altering  their 
own behavior.  Except for wages set under very long contracts,  which 
generally  call for a modest  wage increase  plus an escalator  that frees the 
contractors  from  forecasting,  other  wages  can be set without  attention  to 
the future over which a credible  policy proposal  might be supposed  to 
have effects. 
The last three  possibilities  for affecting  the norm  act directly  on infla- 
tion rather than indirectly through macroeconomic  policies.21 Possi- 
bility (4)  above includes attempts  to improve  productivity  growth  and 
to reduce prices and costs through  excise or payroll tax reductions  or 
through  reform of regulation  or subsidy  programs.  Many proposals  in 
this area are desirable  on grounds  of economic efficiency,  but are op- 
posed  by political  interests.  Their  quantitative  potential  for slowing  infla- 
tion is, realistically,  quite  limited. 
Ultimately,  policymakers  have a choice between  using extensive  slack 
in the economy  to reduce  the norm  and trying  to reduce  it through  either 
incomes  polices  that  complement  demand  restraint  or through  direct  con- 
trols (5)  and (6).  Thoroughgoing  controls  are too rigid, distortive,  and 
21. For a thorough treatment,  see the articles and discussions  in Arthur M. Okun 
and George L. Perry,  eds., Curing  Chronic  Inflation (Brookings  Institution,  1978). George L. Perry  241 
difficult  to administer.  They are a last resort.  The practical  problems  that 
confront  the design and implementation  of incomes policies, especially 
those that include tax incentives  for compliance,  have been analyzed 
extensively.  I will not attempt  a summary  of those issues here. The view 
of the inflation  process  that I have presented  in this paper makes such 
attempts  to alter the norm  both sensible  and attractive  as complements 
to macroeconomic  policy.  The efficient  design  of incomes  policies  should 
be receiving  serious  attention. Comments  by William  Fellner 
As I see it, the concept  of the wage-increase  norm  and of norm  shifts  are 
the main contribution  of George  Perry's  study. My own view of Perry's 
position  is that the changes  he defines  as norm shifts have indeed taken 
place and  need to be stressed,  but that they are identifiable  as reflections 
of changes  in the  basic  policy  posture  of the authorities-are at least suffi- 
ciently well identifiable  to justify concentrating  the analysis  of Perry's 
problem  on the underlying  policy  behavior.  The essential  characteristic  of 
the policy  shift  inducing  Perry's  norm  shifts  was that,  from  an earlier  pos- 
ture  based  on the conception  that a noninflationary  price  trend  should  be 
very closely approximated,  policymakers  moved to practices strongly 
motivated  by the "Phillips  trade-off"  at the expense  of price  stability. 
It is in the nature  of these trade-off  oriented  practices  that they do not 
add  up to an articulate  system  or posture-to  a credible  and predictable 
policy-because under such practices  inflationary  expectations  steepen 
and hence  the trade-off  requires  accommodating,  a price trend that also 
tends  to steepen.  The result  is that  in order  to prevent  the trend  from  get- 
ting  out  of hand  too rapidly  the authorities  occasionally  engage  for a while 
in restrictive  action,  thereby  interrupting  the steepening  tendency  at un- 
predictable  stages  of the process  and to an unpredictable  extent.  What  is 
predictable  after  a shift  to such  policies  is a general  tendency  of the infla- 
tionary  process  to accelerate,  and  this not only shifts  Perry's  norms  when 
the earlier  posture  is abandoned,  but also renders  them  unstable. 
The position  I take in this debate  ties in with what in these meetings 
and  elsewhere  I referred  to as the credibility  hypothesis  or the valid core 
of rationality  hypotheses  in expectations  theory.  This is a view involving 
inter  alia emphasis  on the difference  between  the existence  and the non- 
existence  of a consistent  and credible  policy posture.  In contrast  to what 
has sometimes  been said, this is not a view attributing  significance  to 
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mere declarations  of intention  by policymakers.  A credible  posture  by 
which expectations  can be conditioned  obviously requires  a record of 
consistency.  But  the  time  needed  for establishing  the credibility  of a return 
to the earlier  anti-inflationary  posture,  and  for overcoming  the carry-over 
effect  of past commitments,  would be much shorter  than is predicted  by 
neo-Keynesian  standard  models. Predictions  based on standard  models 
are  strongly  influenced  by cost-setting  and  pricing  practices  that  reflect  the 
post-1965 policy practices  and that would become adjusted  again to a 
consistent  and  credible  anti-inflationary  policy. 
The Valid Core  of Rational  Expectations 
My interpretation  is based on a conception that can be briefly  de- 
scribed  by four propositions.  I do not know whether  it is useful or even 
fair to attribute,  for the sake of comparison,  specific  views to a recent 
rational  expectations  school in the narrower  sense;  to the extent  that this 
may be useful and fair, I would say that this school rejects  the third  and 
the fourth of my propositions.  Yet much of the criticism  of the neo- 
Keynesian standard approach  has implied these propositions, and it 
seems  desirable  in my view that  what  will survive  as the rational  expecta- 
tions approach  should include all four. The propositions  can be briefly 
summarized. 
First, errors-imperfections  of foresight-are responsible  for the fact 
that the actual path of real variables  is not an equilibrium  path deter- 
mined  by the real supply  prices  of the inputs  and by the value placed  on 
the output  obtainable  from the inputs. 
Second, circumstances  are conceivable in which all movements of 
economic  variables  could be described  as consisting  of a detectable  sys- 
tematic  component  and of a stochastic  error  component.  In this case the 
systematic  component  would  be predicted  by the markets  (except to the 
extent  that acquisition  of such knowledge  is not worth  its cost). Even in 
this case, the stochastic component would cause deviations from an 
imaginary  path lacking  any such error  component. 
Third,  even in the circumstances  described  above,  the deviations  from 
the imaginary  path that is free from errors  would develop  not merely  at 
the time when unexpected  events  occur, but also in anticipation  of such 
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in itself unexpected,  and because  the public  is not generally  risk-neutral. 
This proposition  contributes  to the understanding  of what is usually  re- 
ferred  to as quantity  adjustment  rather  than full price adjustment  in a 
world  of uncertainty.  It contributes  also to the understanding  of the fact 
that some input  commitments  are made well ahead  of time. From these 
advance  commitments  it follows  in turn  that  if the error  terms  are  serially 
correlated  and if compensatory  demand  policy works  with lags that are 
short enough, such a policy may be effective,  though it does have its 
obvious  risks. 
Fourth, it is not generally useful to describe  the way in which the 
policy variables  are set by maintaining  that the policy has a detectable 
systematic  component  to which a stochastic  component  is added.  To say 
that a policy can usefully  be so described  means  describing  policies that 
belong in a special set into which some policies do and others do not 
belong.  Take, for example,  policy practices  that accommodate  inflation- 
ary expectations  and continue  to do so when these expectations  steepen, 
yet interrupt  full accommodation  for a while at stages  of the acceleration 
that do not remain  the same on successive  occasions.  Such policy prac- 
tices will keep the public  guessing  about  a system  underlying  these prac- 
tices, but groups  of individuals  will arrive  at significantly  different  con- 
clusions  about  the course  of events  to be expected.  All such expectations 
will be held with little confidence:  risk allowances  will be large and they 
will differ  among  market  participants.  It is not useful to interpret  such 
practices  as containing  a detectable  systematic  component  that becomes 
known  by the markets.  What is recognized  by the markets  is merely a 
crude  outline  of tendencies  to be expected,  with a great  deal of disagree- 
ment and uncertainty  developing  about all details relevant  to decision- 
making. 
Unrealistic  Implications  of "Standard  Models" 
These four propositions  describe what I consider  the valid core of 
rationality  hypotheses  in the theory  of expectations.  Acceptance  of these 
propositions  implies rejection  of approaches  that link wage and price 
movements  to past movements  of these variables  by unchanging  coeffi- 
cients. These "standard approaches,"  illustrated by  neo-Keynesian 
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that do have a recognizable  design,  and they give an unrealistic  account 
also of the reaction  to policy practices  that do not have such a design. 
If a policy does have a recognizable  and credible  design,  expectations 
will be formed  in view of that design,  and wages and prices  will change 
accordingly.  Take, for example,  expectations  in the era of the gold stan- 
dard  while that  system  was credible.  At that time the markets  clearly  did 
not base their behavior  on the expectation  that the future level of an 
exchange  rate  that  has moved  near  its upper  gold point can be derived  by 
linking  the future  movements  of the rate with those of the past by un- 
changing  coefficients  involving  an unchanging  lag structure.  Decisions  in 
the markets  were  normally  made  on the assumption  that  the rate  will not 
move beyond the upper gold point. Similarly,  if demand-management 
practices  were firmly expected to keep movements  of the price level 
within narrow  limits, such a design would be figured  out, cost trends 
would take shape accordingly,  and output losses, a threat that such a 
policy would imply,  would not in fact occur. 
The case for the neo-Keynesian  standard  approach  is only seemingly 
better  if the policy practices  have no recognizable  design,  or if an alleged 
design  has little credibility,  with the result that shaky guesses relate at 
best to the crude  outline  of the future  conduct  of policy. It is hard  to tell 
what the least unsatisfactory  method is of arriving  at macroeconomic 
generalizations  in such circumstances.  But if in these circumstances  the 
public  tries  to see its way through  its problems  by rules  of thumb  express- 
ing adjustments  of nominal supply prices to events of the recent past, 
these coefficients  of the neo-Keynesian  type could not be expected to 
remain  stable.  Nor can the coefficients  be expected  to remain  stable  in a 
transition  toward  a detectable  system  or design  of policy formation,  that 
is, during  a period  when such a system  is acquiring  credibility  and when 
the aftereffects  of earlier  commitments  still are  felt. 
Policy  Practices  and  Perry's  Norm  Shifts 
For Perry's  sample  period  as a whole, 1954-80, the observed  instabil- 
ity of coefficients  that leads him to introduce  the concept  of norm shifts 
develops  because of the transition  from a subperiod  in which a price- 
level stabilizing  policy design  did have credibility  to a subperiod  with no 
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included  a few years  during  which  the public doubted  the consistency  of 
the policy posture.  These doubts were suppressed  in 1958 and 1961, 
years  that had weighted  unemployment  rates of 5.9 and 5.6 percent,  in 
contrast  to the other years of the 1954-65  period when the average 
weighted  unemployment  rate was 4.0 percent.  The years from 1961 to 
about 1965 were years characterized  by price stability  and an average 
weighted  unemployment  rate  of 4.3 percent.  During  the post-1965 era of 
accommodative  laxity in policymaking  and of rising prices, this unem- 
ployment  rate  was first  reduced  for a while to well below 3 percent,  and 
it then shot up to high levels in an environment  in which inflation  not 
only has continued  but has shown a pronounced  tendency  to steepen. 
Only  in the very early  stages  of the post-1965 inflationary  era was the 
short-term  Phillips  trade-off  favorable  for a few years.  By now a trade-off 
exists  probably  only in the sense that the output  costs of disinflating  de- 
mand will have to be borne in the immediate  future,  while the output 
costs of the continued  accommodation  of inflationary  expectations  would 
be spread  out over a period of indefinite  length, starting  from a lower 
level but growing  rapidly  and cumulating. 
The point to be stressed  here is that not only are Perry's  norm shifts 
closely related  to shifts in policy practices,  but that it would be uncon- 
vincing  to attribute  to the norm shifts any active role-any  role of a 
"horse"  rather  than  of a "cart"-up to the time  when,  under  the influence 
of the policy shifts, the norm shifts acquired  a momentum  of their own. 
To illustrate  with Perry's  annual  data, in view of the earlier  relation- 
ships  among  the variables  no autonomous  norm  shifts  need to be assumed 
to explain  the fact that the demand  expansion  resulting  in the weighted 
unemployment  rates of 1965 and 1966 (post-Korean  lows of 3.2 and 
2.6 percent) would have required  more than the temporary  1967 re- 
straint  to stop the steepening  of inflation.  That restraint  resulted in a 
0.1 point increase  for 1967 of the weighted  rate (to 2.7 percent). In 
fact, the norms do not even seem to have reacted to the policy shift 
until somewhat  later. Further,  no autonomous  norm shifts need to be 
assumed  to explain  that  the reduction  of the weighted  unemployment  rate 
to new  lows  in 1968 and 1969 (2.4 and  2.3 percent)  would  have  required 
more than  the temporary  restraint  of 1971 to stop an inflation  that had 
further  steepened.  That restraint  resulted  in a rise of the weighted  un- 
employment  rate  for 1971 to about  the 1954-65 average  level. 
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changed  policy posture, and this has by now produced a situation in 
which  the shift  in Perry's  norms  makes  a temporary  loss of output  in the 
near  future  inevitable  as compared  to the situation  that  would exist if the 
earlier  anti-inflationary  posture had been maintained.  But only to the 
extent  that  the authorities  have been postponing  the decision  to return  to 
that posture  have Perry's  norm shifts recently  been given the role of the 
"horse"  drawing  the policy "cart."  The problem  itself developed  through 
policy shifts that induced  Perry's  norm shifts and induced them with a 
lag. Subsequent  attempts  to adjust  policies to norm shifts  brought  about 
by earlier  policies must destabilize  the economy.  In such circumstances, 
further  norm  shifts  develop  in anticipation  of further  policy adjustments, 
and they develop amid substantial  uncertainty  about all relevant  details 
of the future  course  of the economy. 
Should this interpretation  of the norm shifts in terms of changing 
policy  postures  be qualified  by the effect  on the norms  of the recent  steep 
increases  in the price of crude materials?  These increases,  and the way 
in which the population  will inevitably  "accept"  the resulting  burden 
and its distribution,  were largely  unforeseen.  Such events  would, I think, 
cause a temporary  rise in the general  price level in any event. However, 
the size of this rise, and whether  a temporary  rise generates  a further  in- 
flationary  process  or remains  a one-time  rise,  or is subsequently  reversed, 
does depend greatly on the demand-management  practices the public 
expects  to be put into effect.  Hence,  while  it would  be misleading  to over- 
look the complications  these events introduce  into any interpretation  of 
the observed  general  price  movements,  I do not believe  that the effect  of 
these specific  price increases  should  be regarded  as having  had a lasting 
effect on Perry's norms independently of  the demand policy  practices. 
Thus  I see no reason  for modifying  my suggested  interpretation  of Perry's 
norm  shifts  as reflecting  policy shifts. Comments  by Robert  J. Gordon 
Since  my initial assessment  of the inflation  process appeared  in the first 
issue of Brookings  Papers  a decade ago, George  Perry  and I have taken 
turns  at these meetings  in our attempts  to provide  quantitative  explana- 
tions of the relation  between  inflation  and both supply  and demand  fac- 
tors. Because  I disagree  more with Perry's  present  paper than with his 
previous  research,  I find  it appropriate  to place  both our positions  within 
the general  context of developments  of the past decade. After present- 
ing a brief summary  of my own approach,  I provide an alternative  em- 
pirical  explanation  of the wage data Perry examines  and then demon- 
strate  how drastically  different  are  the policy implications  of our differing 
results. 
At the beginning  of the 1970s, the main debate concerned  the then- 
controversial  natural  rate  hypothesis  (NRI-I)  that denied  the existence  of 
a long-run  trade-off  between  inflation  and unemployment.  My allegiance 
shifted  rapidly  toward  NRH as I found  that  equations  including  1970 and 
early  1971 data  could  not reject  it. Most economists  now accept  the  NRH, 
and Perry's  present  paper represents  an infrequent  exception.  Below I 
suggest  that  Perry's  "norm  shift,"  which  begins  in 1970, attempts  to cap- 
ture  the same  feature  of the 1970-71 data  that  converted  me to the  NRH. 
Three  Views  of the  Inflation  Process 
Today most disputes about inflation,  and macroeconomic  policy in 
general,  focus on the speed  of adjustment  of inflation  to shifts  in nominal 
aggregate  demand.  Three  main  views of the inflation  process  compete  for 
attention,  differing  mainly  on this  adjustment  speed.  First  is Perry's  "main- 
line view,"  which in its usual version  makes  wage change  a function  of 
lagged  consumer  price  inflation,  lagged  wages, and a single  demand  vari- 
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able,  the inverse  of an unemployment  rate  weighted  to remove  the impact 
of demographic  shifts.'  In the new 1980 version  Perry  replaces  the lagged 
wage change  variable  with his "norm  shift"  dummy,  and he thus moves 
away  from  the NRH by disavowing  any systematic  process  by which ex- 
cess demand  or supply is converted  into a shift in the norm. In this 
"bootstraps"  view of inflation  the consequences  of restrictive  monetary 
policy are limited to movements  along a fixed short-run  Phillips curve 
until the norm changes.  Perry  expects that sustained  slack would move 
the norm,  but does not estimate  how much slack it would take and for 
how much  time in order  to move the norm  by a given amount. 
What  is the verdict of the mainline  view on the crucial  elasticity  for 
policy purposes,  the fraction  of nominal  demand  change  taking  the form 
of price  change  for a given  interval?  The traditional  mainline  estimate,  as 
summarized  by Arthur  Okun,  is a fraction  of about 10 percent  during  the 
first year after the demand  change, providing  a pessimistic  reading  of 
the benefits  of anti-inflationary  demand  policy and an optimistic  view of 
the consequences  of accommodating  supply shocks.2  Perry's paper is 
harder  to characterize  because the norm change eventually  enters the 
picture.  But for the first  year, a wage  response  of about 15 percent  of the 
nominal  GNP slowdown  is implied  in his table 6. He acknowledges  that 
price  responsiveness  would add a little more. 
At the other extreme  is the second major approach  to inflation,  the 
Lucas-Sargent  proposition of policy ineffectiveness  (LSP).  Although 
usually  stated as a theory  of output  determination,  LSP implies  that the 
contemporaneous  elasticity  of price change  to a fully anticipated  change 
in aggregate  demand  is exactly unity. Since empirical  work shows that 
anticipated  demand  responds  quickly  to changes  in actual  demand,  LSP 
thus  implies  a prompt  and  complete  reaction  of prices  to an actual  decline 
in nominal  demand  growth.  William  Fellner's  credibility  hypothesis  also 
assumes  a high elasticity  of price change  to a "credible"  shift  in demand 
growth  engineered  by policymakers,  but he is vague about  the length of 
time needed  for the public  to conclude  that a given  policy shift  is perma- 
nent rather  than temporary. 
1. George L. Perry, "Slowing  the Wage-Price  Spiral: The Macroeconomic  View," 
BPEA, 2:1978, pp. 259-91. 
2. Arthur M.  Okun, "Efficient Disinflationary Policies," American Economic 
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An Intermediate  View of Inflation 
Between  the mainline  price-responsiveness  fraction  of 10 to 20 percent 
and the LSP fraction  of 100 percent  is my intermediate  view. In recent 
research  on historical  quarterly  data  going  back to 1890, I have rejected 
the LSP, finding  a responsiveness  to anticipated  demand  changes  during 
the first  year that is closer to one-third  than 100 percent.3  The most im- 
portant  reason  that I find a fraction  as large as one-third,  as contrasted 
with the smaller  mainline  estimate,  is that my research  is not limited  to 
wage  equations.  Much  of the impact  of aggregate  demand  on the inflation 
process  comes  in the response  of prices  relative  to wages.  This is evident 
not only when separate  wage and price  equations  are estimated,  but also 
when  a single  reduced-form  price  equation  is studied.4 
Main  Features  of the Intermediate  Approach 
The underlying  specification  of my wage and price equations  is com- 
pletely symmetric.  Wage change depends on lagged changes in wages, 
product  prices,  and consumer  prices.  The impact  of aggregate  demand  is 
represented  by both the level and change  in the real GNP gap. Because 
Okun's  Law continues  to work so well, it is possible  to replace  the tradi- 
tional unemployment  variable  with the gap, which allows the wage and 
price  equations  to be specified  in a way  that  directly  includes  the elasticity 
of the dependent  variable  with respect  to changes  in nominal  aggregate 
demand.  The wage  equation  also tests  for the effects  of guideposts,  Nixon 
controls,  payroll  taxes, the personal  income  tax, and the minimum  wage. 
The price  equation  is set up in the same  way, depending  on lagged  wages, 
the level and  change  of the gap, and  four  other  shift  variables-the Nixon 
controls,  the deviation  of actual  productivity  change  from  its ever-slowing 
3.  Robert  J. Gordon, "Price  Inertia and Policy Ineffectiveness,"  National Bureau 
of Economic Research,  working paper (forthcoming in 1980). 
4.  Perry regards  the estimation of equations relating prices to wages as an im- 
portant research task. Nevertheless, his authorship of  papers about inflation that 
contain only wage equations has had the unfortunate consequence of leading Okun 
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trend,  changes  in the relative  price  of capital,  and  the effect  of changes  in 
the relative  prices  of food and  energy. 
The nature  of the overall  inflationary  process can be studied  by esti- 
mating  this model as a single reduced-form  equation,  and the behavior 
of wages and prices can be investigated  more closely by also estimating 
separate  "structural"  wage and price equations.  The total elasticity  of 
inflation  to nominal  demand  change  is about  0.15 in the first  quarter  and 
about  0.33 in the first  year. These elasticities  characterize  the history  of 
U.S. price change  since 1892. This demand  effect  is contributed  by both 
the wage and price  equations,  and both the level and change  in the GNP 
gap  seem  to matter  in each equation. 
The estimates  of the inflation  model also bear on several  other  issues. 
My results  support  Perry's  conclusion  that there  is only a modest  25 per- 
cent pass-through  from consumer  prices  to wages;  thus the United States 
is far from having  a fully indexed  economy  and has much more  latitude 
than some European  countries  to consider  the partial  accommodation  of 
supply shocks. Nevertheless, this 25  percent pass-through  has been 
enough  to allow the supply  shocks  of the 1970s partially  to enter  wages 
and largely  accounts  for the upward  ratcheting  of the rate of wage infla- 
tion  between  the beginning  and  the end  of the decade. 
The Nixon price  controls  had a major  impact  on the timing  of inflation 
in the 1970s, but not on its cumulative  amount.  My new results  indicate 
a larger  transitory  impact  of the controls  on both prices and wages than 
in some  of my previous  papers.  A deviation  of productivity  from  its trend 
has a very marked  negative  impact  on inflation-my current  estimate  of 
the elasticity  is about  -0.2,  and  this  helps  partially  to explain  the acceler- 
ation of inflation  in 1974 and 1979 and the small increase  in inflation 
performance  in 1964-65 and 1976-77. A slowdown  in the productivity 
trend itself enters the inflation  process through  the aggregate  demand 
variable,  which is defined  as nominal  GNP growth  minus the growth  in 
potential  real GNP. Thus a slowdown  of 1 percentage  point in potential 
real growth  is just as inflationary  as a 1 point acceleration  in nominal 
GNP growth. 
The model can also be used to measure  the impact  of changes  in taxes 
and  in the minimum  wage.  The reduced-form  price  equation  suggests  very 
little impact  of the payroll  tax on inflation.  Overall  the employee  share  is 
borne entirely  by employees, and the employer  share about one-third 
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forward  shifting  of the personal  income  tax, there appears  to be no anti- 
inflationary  mileage  in substituting  the personal  tax for the payroll  tax. 
The inflationary  effect  of the minimum  wage seems  robust  but relatively 
minor;  the series  of minimum-wage  hikes during  1977-81 adds at most 
0.5 percentage  point  to the price  level.5 
An Empirical  Comparison 
Much of Perry's discussion of inflation during the 1970s revolves 
around  the special nature of the period between 1970 and 1975, and 
around  the role of the two "norm  shift"  dummies  for  the 1950s and 1970s. 
While  Perry  offers  no explanation  for changes  in the norm,  he neverthe- 
less argues  that  these  dummies  are  indispensable  for an empirical  explana- 
tion of wage change.  Because of space limitations,  my discussion  of his 
empirical  results  is confined  to a demonstration  that  wage  changes  can be 
explained  without  the 1970s norm shift. I do find that his 1950s norm 
shift  is quite  robust,  and  I discuss  the implications  of this  finding  below. 
In my table 1, column  1 displays  an equation  similar  to Perry's  for the 
full 1954-80  period, using my data and a version of his slope shift 
dummy,  the ratio of the 1970s norm  shift dummy  to the unemployment 
rate.  This switch,  including  the early  quarters  of 1970, produces  a virtu- 
ally horizontal  Phillips curve for the  1970s. However, Perry argues 
against  this interpretation  and it is not essential  to the comparison  with 
my alternative  specification. 
Column  2 adds  a dummy  for the  Nixon controls  program.  This dummy 
is constructed  to sum  to zero and  thus  forces  the effect  of program  termi- 
nation to cancel its initial impact. The Nixon dummy aids in the ex- 
planation  of the early 1970s and reduces  somewhat  the coefficient  on the 
consumer  price  index (which  otherwise  carries  the full burden  of explain- 
ing the 1974 wage  acceleration). 
Column  3 presents  my preferred  specification,  with a few modifications 
to aid  in the comparison  with  Perry's  results.  The tax and  minimum  wage 
variables  have been omitted  from the equations  to simplify  the table. In 
addition  to the change  in nominal  GNP and  the lagged  GNP gap (the lat- 
ter measured  to indicate  a recession  as a negative  gap), on line 7 a gap 
5.  With the exception of the Nixon controls variable, the effects discussed in the 
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Table 1. Estimated  Equations  for Wage  and  Price Inflation,  Alternative  Models, 
1954:1-1980:1Bl 
Wage equlation  Reduced- 
Perry's  Effect of  Effect of lagged  form price 
Independent variable or  equationi  conztrols  wage iniflationi  equationt 
summary statistic  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Indepe, dent varicable 
1. Constant  -0.25  -0.25  2.76  2.80  0.85 
(-0.39)  (-0.41)  (5.36)  (5.94)  (2.96) 
2. Unemployment  14.81  15.53 
(4.41)  (4.71) 
3. Lagged  unemployment  -3.30  -3.39  ...  ... 
(-1.06)  (- 1. 11) 
4. Slope shift, 1970s  -8.64  -9.87  ...  ...  ... 
(-2.32)  (-2.68) 
5. Growth of aggregate  ...  ...  0.08  0.08  0.17 
demand  (3.39)  (3.31)  (5.78) 
6. Lagged  real GNP gap  ...  ...  0.25  ...  0.22 
(3.90)  (3.89) 
7. Gap shift, 1970s  ...  ...  -0.11  -0.06  0.09 
(-1.03)  (-0.63)  (0.68) 
8. Adjusted  lagged gap  ...  ...  ...  0.23  ... 
(3.92) 
9. Lagged  CPI inflation  0.36  0.28  ...  ...  ... 
(6.81)  (4.46) 
10. Lagged  CPI inflation  ...  ...  0.22  0.22  ... 
minus  lagged  wage  (2.67)  (2.69) 
inflation 
11. Food and energy  effect  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.38 
(2.92) 
12. Guidepost  dummy  -0.25  -0.32  -0.40  -0.41  -1.17 
(-0.63)  (-0.85)  (-1.04)  (-1.19)  (-2.65) 
13. Nixon controls  dummy  ...  -0.96  -1.46  -1.45  -3.77 
(-2.28)  (-3.06)  (-3.08)  (-7.29) 
14. Norm shift, 1950s  0.80  0.76  0.68 
(2.58)  (2.51)  (2.06) 
15. Norm shift, 1970s  4.35  5.04  1.01  ... 
(3.94)  (4.49)  (0.92) 
16. Lagged  wage inflation,  ...  ...  0.30  0.30  ... 
1954-67b  (2.27)  (2.31) 
17. Lagged  wage inflation,  ...  ...  0.45  0.60  ... 
1968-80b  (2.44)  (8.26) 
18. Lagged  price  inflation?  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.76 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Wage  equation  Reduced- 
Perry's  Effect of  Effect of lagged  form price 
Independent  var-iable  or  eqluation  controls  wage  inflation  equation 
summary  statistic  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Summary  statistic 
f? 2  0.82  0.83  0.85  0.84  0.86 
Standard  error  of estimate  0.90  0.88  0.87  0.87  1.09 
Durbin-Watson  2.11  2.20  2.17  2.16  1.79 
Sources: The average hourly earnings index and the weighted unemployment rate are the same series 
as used by George Perry. Price and GNP data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, national 
income and product accounts. The consumer price index is from the U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  The depenident  variable in the wage equations is the same as that used by Perry. The dependent vari- 
able in the price equations is the quarterly percent change in the GNP deflator, multiplied by four. The 
unemployment and lagged unemployment variables are the inverse of  Perry's weighted unemployment 
rate, as in Perry's  paper. The slope shift variable is the 1970s norm shift dummy divided by the weighted 
unemployment rate. Aggregate demand growth is measured by the annualized percent change of nominal 
GNP  minus the annualized percent change in  potential  real  GNP.  The potential GNP  series is the 
QPOT1 series provided by Jeffrey M. Perloff and Michael L. Wachter that is described in their "A Pro- 
duction  Function-Nonaccelerating  Inflation  Approach  to  Potential  Output:  Is  Measured  Potential 
OLutput  Too High?" in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer, eds., Three  Aspects of Policy and  Policymnaking: 
Knowledge,  Data and Institutionis,  Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol.  10 (Am- 
sterdam: North-Holland, 1979), pp.  113-63.  The lagged real GNP  gap is the one-quarter lagged ratio 
of actual to potential real GNP, minus one, and the 1970s gap shift is this variable times the 1970 norm 
shift dummy. In column 4 the lagged gap variable is adjusted by subtracting 2.5 percent from potential 
GNP between 1954 and 1961. The lagged CPI vatiable is the sum of quarterly  changes in the CPI in quar- 
ters t  -  1 through t  -  4, and the "lagged CPI inflation minus lagged wage inflation" variable subtracts 
the values of the dependent variable for the same quarters. The food and energy effect is the difference 
between the deflators for personal consumption expenditures including and excluding food  and energy. 
The guidepost dummy is similar to Perry's. The "Nixon controls" dummy is equal to 0.67 during the six 
quarters  from 1971  :3 to 1972:4 and to  -1.00  from 1974:2 to 1975:1. The norm shift dummies are identical 
to Perry's. Th-e  nuLmbers  in parentheses are t-statistics. 
b. These coefficients are the sum of a set of  twelve lagged coefficients estimated to lie along a  third- 
degree polynomial with the far end point constrained to zero. 
c.  Same as note b, except that there are twenty lagged coefficients. 
shift is introduced  that is exactly analogous  to the slope shift on line 4. 
An important  difference  is line 10, where  the CPI effect  is measured  net 
of wage  change  (this does not alter  the fit or the coefficients  on the norm 
shift dummies  but allows the explanation  of the 1965-70  acceleration 
of inflation  to be "carried"  by the lagged  wage terms  rather  than by the 
CPI itself-this  variable  is thus more directly  a measure  of the response 
of wages  to supply  shocks). These shifts  in specification  are sufficient  to 
reduce  the 1970s norm shift dummy  to statistical  insignificance. 
One  interpretation  of the significance  of the 1950s  norm  shift  in column 
3 is that the GNP gap is mismeasured.  One implausible  feature  of the 
potential  output  series  of Jeffrey  Perloff  and Michael  Wachter  that I use 
is that there  was no excess demand  in 1956 or 1957, and thus the equa- 
tion cannot  fully explain  the acceleration  of wage change  in those years. 
Column  4 adjusts  the lagged  gap variable  by subtracting  2.5 percent  from 256  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
Table  2. Simulated  Effect  on Wage  and  Price Change  of a Five Percent  Instead  of a 
Ten Percent  Growth  in Aggregate  Demand,  Selected  Quarters,  1980:2-1989:4a 
Percentage  points 
Year  anid  Effect on wvage  Effect onz  price 
quarter  change  chanige 
1980:4  -1.09  -1.75 
1981:4  -1.72  -3.38 
1982:4  -2.05  -4.62 
1989:4  -2.52  -5.35 
Source: Derived from equations in table 1, columns 4 and 5. 
a.  The growth in aggregate demand is the difference between the annualized growth rates of nominal 
GNP and potential real GNP,  the same variable listed in table 1, lilne 5. 
potential  GNP between 1954 and 1961 and also drops  the insignificant 
1970s norm  shift dummy.  The resulting  equation  has the lowest standard 
error  of all four  wage  equations  in table 1. 
Both wage  equations  in columns  3 and  4 split  the lagged  wage  variable 
at the beginning  of 1968. Thus the phenomenon  that Perry  is attempting 
to capture  in his norm shift variable  for the 1970s is partially  incor- 
porated  in the shifting  coefficients  on lagged wages. As the rational  ex- 
pectations  theorists  have shown, the weight of a lagged variable  in the 
formation  of expectations  should  depend  on the nature  of the process  it- 
self. An explanation  of wage change  based  on shifting  coefficients  on past 
inflation  was explored  in one of my early  papers.6 
For contrast,  a simple  reduced-form  inflation  equation  is presented  in 
column  5. This displays  about  the same  influence  of the GNP gap as the 
wage  equation  but no evidence  at all of a declining  importance  of the gap 
in the 1970s. The influence  of demand  growth  is more important,  as are 
both the guidepost  and  Nixon control  dummies.  For the NRH to be valid, 
the coefficients  of the nominal  aggregate  demand  variable  and the lagged 
price  should  add  up to unity,  and  the sum  in this  column  is 0.93. 
The differing  policy implications  of columns  4 and 5 are summarized 
in table  2 above.  What  difference  does it make  for wage and  price  change 
if two alternative  constant  growth  rates are postulated  for the aggregate 
demand  variable  between 1980:2 and 1989:4-say,  5 as opposed  to 10 
percent?  The price equation  exhibits  a prompt  response  of price change 
to the more  restrictive  demand  policy, with most of the adjustment  com- 
6.  Robert J. Gordon, "Wage-Price  Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve," 
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plete by late 1982. At that  point  the GNP gap  is 5 percent  more  negative. 
By 1989 that difference  gradually  shrinks  to 0.3 percent.  But the wage 
equation  exhibits  much  more  sluggish  behavior.  Because  wage change  by 
1989 has only slowed down by half of the drop in demand  growth,  the 
GNP gap becomes steadily  more negative  throughout  the decade. This 
pessimistic  verdict  on the consequences  of restrictive  demand  policy re- 
flects  both the smaller  demand  coefficients  in the wage equation  and the 
fact that  the conditions  for the NRI-I  are not satisfied. 
For years now policymakers  have been told that a restrictive  demand 
growth  policy would  have little impact  on inflatioin  and  would impose  an 
enormous  cost in the form of lost output.  The drastic  difference  between 
the implications  of the two columns  of table 2 suggests  the importance  of 
careful  quantitative  estimates  of the responsiveness  of inflation  to changes 
in demand  growth.  I view all the wage equations  in table 1 as presenting 
an incomplete  view of the inflation  process  and as sending  unrealistically 
pessimistic  signals  to policymakers.  While  the price simulation  may look 
surprisingly  optimistic,  it reflects an experiment  that has not yet been 
carried  out, and  there  is no other  basis  on which  to judge  its effects. General  Discussion 
Perry's wage-norm concept generated a  spirited discussion. James 
Duesenberry  found the norm  useful  because  it rejects  an unchanging  and 
mechanical  link of today's  inflation  with the past. He characterized  the 
norm  as the wage increase  a personnel  manager  would  want  to give if his 
firm  had no special employment  needs or problems.  That wage increase 
would be dictated  by what is happening  in other companies,  and, more- 
over, microeconomic  research  is probably  needed  to improve  the under- 
standing  of how  the  norm  changes  at different  times.  Martin  Baily  believed 
the norm  model correctly  disputes  the empirical  foundation  of the natu- 
ral rate  hypothesis,  and especially  the way the natural  rate has been esti- 
mated using lagged  inflation  variables.  Robert  Hall thought  Perry's  for- 
mulation  was helpful in understanding  the defects of models that make 
inflation  largely expectational,  because  these were refuted  by their own 
predictions  of serially  uncorrelated  real disturbances,  and simple auto- 
regressive  structures  for wages,  because  these have yielded  unstable  em- 
pirical results with the autoregressive  structure  vanishing  altogether  in 
the 1970s. 
Other panelists were more critical. Christopher  Sims argued that 
Perry's  result mainly documents  the fact that most inflation  is not ex- 
plained by the conceptual  framework  of his wage equations.  He ques- 
tioned  Perry's  conceptualization  of the norm as a component  of inflation 
that  could  be shifted  without  allocative  consequences,  and  argued  that  one 
could  not reach  policy conclusions  from  estimated  structural  equations  of 
this type.  William  Nordhaus  preferred  the norm  concept  to previous  work 
that specifies  a simple  link to past  inflation,  but argued  that  the concept  is 
not useful until it is possible to establish  how the norm is formed. In 
Perry's  formulation,  it simply  documents  our ignorance  of this important 
problem. 
While  Nordhaus  found  it a weakness  of Perry's  norm  that  it resembled 
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discussions  in Europe  of unexplained  ratchets  in the inflation  rate,  Robin 
Marris  thought  that  an important  point  in favor  of the norm  is that  it has 
widespread  applications.  He related  it to work done earlier  by Perry  and 
others on wage explosions  in the late 1960s and early 1970s in most 
industrial  countries. 
Marris  and others  found the norm concept  has clear policy implica- 
tions for slowing  inflation  even if one could not explain  exactly  how the 
norm  had shifted  upward.  Thomas  Juster  and  John  Shoven  reasoned  that 
the norm  concept  clarified  both analytically  and empirically  the need for 
direct  attempts  to reduce  the ongoing  inflation  rate  through  some  form  of 
incomes policy. However, Nordhaus  objected that Perry's  formulation 
provides  no guidance  about  the costs and benefits  of alternative  disinfla- 
tion remedies  such as William  Fellner's  proposal  for credible  sustained 
economic  restraint.  Nordhaus  suspected  that if the norm could be ex- 
plained,  it might have little or no expectational  component,  but he re- 
garded  this as the critical object for research.  Marris  pointed out that 
incomes  policies historically  carry  large political costs and that the de- 
cision  to use them always  weighs  that  political  cost against  the economic 
cost of producing  slack  or permitting  inflation  to continue.  He noted that 
the present  government  in the United Kingdom  is adopting  something 
like a Fellner  approach  in the  belief  that  its political  costs  will be tolerable. 
Hall interpreted  Perry's  results  on monetarism  as showing  that mone- 
tary  changes  have  large  effects  on output  and  only minor  effects  on prices 
in the short run, a result that is consistent  with Robert Barro's  recent 
empirical  work.  But he found  that  these results  do not refute  rational ex- 
pectations  models because they do not test them specifically.  Baily re- 
sponded  that a key prescription  of rational  expectations  models is pre- 
cisely that monetary  policy could slow inflation  without  a major  cost in 
output and employment.  Sims agreed with Perry that inflation  in the 
1970s cannot  be explained  as a reaction  to the conduct  of aggregate  de- 
mand  management  or, in particular,  monetary  policy. But he believed a 
more sophisticated  rational expectations  view that treated energy as a 
macroeconomic  variable  might explain the stagflation  effects of OPEC 
price  increases. 
Benjamin  Friedman  observed  that Fellner's "valid core" of rational 
expectations,  which  he had outlined  in his discussion,  consists  of proposi- 
tions with which almost any economist  would agree. Moreover,  it does 
not include  the more debatable  propositions  usually associated  with ra- 260  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
tional expectations  macro  models.  James  Tobin disagreed  with Fellner's 
characterization  that the public  perceived  a shift in policy in the 1960s 
from an orientation  toward  stable  prices  to a conscious  attempt  to move 
along a Phillips  curve.  Tobin argued  that the guidelines  policy of 1961- 
65 had been devised precisely  because policymakers  considered  it un- 
acceptable  to have a recovery  that was accompanied  by inflation.  The 
inflation  of 1966-69 was not in fact the consequence  of deliberate  policy 
to gain  employment  at the expense  of higher  inflation.  It was the result  of 
President  Johnson's  escalation  of the Vietnam  War and his rejection  of 
the fiscal advice of his Keynesian economists.  The episode probably 
merely  reinforced  the association  in the public's  mind between  war and 
inflation. 
Commenting  on Robert  Gordon's  discussion,  Nordhaus  noted  that  the 
greater  cyclical  response  of prices  relative  to wages  that Gordon  empha- 
sized is a purely transitory  difference.  Because Gordon's  formulation 
makes  price changes  responsive  to changes  in employment  or unemploy- 
ment, any gains achieved  from that source  when the economy  went into 
recession  are  reversed  as soon as the economy  returns  to its initial  utiliza- 
tion rate. 